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Flat-rate pay-as-you-go  pension plans and funded pensions
produce  very  different  distributional  outcome's,  the single  most
important  determinant  of which  is the different  lifetime  employ-
ment and earnings  records of men and women.
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Using a dynamic  cohort  microsimulation  model  * In funded  pension  systems,  on average  men
(LIFEMOD),  FalUingham  and Johnson  examine  accumulate  much  more pension  capital  than
the life-cycle  distributional  consequences  of a  women  do because  of men's higher eamings and
variety of pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  and funded  more  continuous  paid work.  Different  rates of
pension systems.  This technique  allows them to  real interest and eamings  growth affect individu-
investigate  both the socioeconomic  characteris-  als' fund accumulation  differently.  Women
tics and the number  of people  affected  by a  benefit  more from high rates  of return  and low
change  in contribution  or eligibility  rules in any  earnings  growth  because  they  tend to receive  a
pension  system.  higher  proportion  of their lifetime  earnings  when
young.  But some men and many women  fail to
LIFEMOD  uses 1985  parameters  for the  achieve  minimum  pension  levels. If the pension
United  Kingdom  so specific  results are not valid  shortfall  is compensated  for by lump-sum  capital
for other countries.  But winners  and losers are  top-ups,  women  receive  93 percent  of top-ups
likely to be similar  across  countries.  They find  (70 percent  if joint contributions  are used).
that:
* In hybrid  pension  systems  that combine
* Women  benefit  much more  than men in a  both PAYG  and funded  elements,  the higher  the
flat-rate  PAYG system.  In simulations,  84  proportion  of PAYG  payments,  the greater  the
percent of surviving  women  but only 33 percent  replacement  rate for people  in the bottom  40
of surviving  men are net beneficiaries,  because  percent  of the lifetime  eamings distribution  (the
women have  higher  life expectancy  and lower  majority  of whom  are women).  But replacement
lifetime  earnings.  rates for pcople  in the middle  of income  distribu-
tion are insensitive  to any variant of the PAYG-
* Imposing  minimum  contributions  substan-  funded  combination.
tially reduces  the number  of women  who qualify
for a pension. Imposing  a joint contribution  rule  In short,  flat-rate  pay-as-you-go  pension
on the earnings  of married  couples  significantly  plans and funded  pensions  produce  very differcnt
increases  the number  of women  qualifying  distributional  outcomes,  the single most impor-
without  significantly  reducing  the proportion  of  tant determinant  of which is the different  lifetime
qualifying  men.  employment  and earnings  records  of men and
women.
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l.  Context
The reform of public pension systems is a prominent  policy issue ir, both the newly
industrializing  anct the  older  industrial  economies.  Countries  as geographically,
economically  and  ideologically diverse  as Argentina,  China, Japan and Sweden are
now  inaug,.rating,  or  conternplating  the  introduction  of, public  pension  reform.
Although  the  proximate  political  and  economic  reasons  for reform vary  between
countries, three  common influences can be seen to be at work in both the old and the
new  industrial  economies.
First is the demographic  condition  of population  ageing.  A rapid fall in fertility rates
since  the 1960s and rising adult  life expectancy  have  combined to produce  -,  uid
ageing from both  the base and the apex  of the population  pyramid.  The proportion
of older persons  in industrial  societies is rising and so also is the cost of the pensions
required  to support  these older  people  who,  for a complex mix of social, economic
and physiological factors, can no longer support  themselves through participation  in
the labour market.
Second is the trend towards pension system  maturity.  Public pensions based on pay-
as-you-go  principles  tend  to be cheap  to  operate  when  new since they have many
contributors  and  few beneficiaries, but  over  time  these ratios  change and  the  costs
rise.  Costs  can be temporarily  contained  by incorporating  new groups  of workers
into the pension  system, thereby  expanding  the contribution  base, but once most of
the  population  is  so  covered  the  scope  for  further  system  expansion  obviously
becomes minimal.  After several decades  of low-cost expansion many public pension
systems  are now having to face the uncomfortably  high  costs of stable steady-state
financing.Third  comes the economic and  political  consequence  of a global slo%v-d3wn  in the
rate of economic growth.  The expansion  of public pension provision  since the 1960s
has been financed by larger  public  revenues  generated  by a higher overall  level of
taxation.  Ageing and pension system maturity  are together creating further pressures
for tax increases to cover rising pension  costs, but  tax increases are politically more
difficult to sustain when uverall  income-  are stagnant  or falling than when  they are
rising.  Furthermore,  one interpretation  of the slow-down  in growth  is that  it is to
some extent a function of high  taxes and  !arge and inefficient public sectors.
Together  these three influences contribute  towards  a global interest in cost-reducing
reform of public pension expenditure.  However,  these economic and fiscal pressures
are not the  only factors that  need  to be  considered  in any pension  reform;  equally
important  are the distributional  outcomes  of pension systems.  If pension refcrms  so
alter  pension  outcomes  that  large  groups  of  the  pensioner  population  become
incapable  of supporting  themselves  in oldI age then the reforms will fail.  They will
fail politically if they cannot  gain the support  of the electoral majority, arLd  they will
fail economically if the government  ends  up  substituting  minimum  income welfare
payments  for pensioners  who  previously  would  have  received  minimum  penrson
benefits.  Pension reform proposals,  therefore,  need to be assessed in terms  of their
distributional  as well as their fiscal and  macro-economic consequences.
This  paper  analyzes  the  life-cycle  distributional  outcomes  of  a  wide  variety  of
possible pay-as-you-go and  funded  pension  systems.  The second part  of the paper
briefly surveys  the major characteristics  of existing pension systems and  establishes
why  distributional  outcomes  are  an  important  aspect  of pension  system  analysis.
Section 3 explains how a dynamic cohort microsimulation model can directly address
these  distributional  issues,  and  then  summarizes  the  key concepts,  principles  and
parameters  of the LIFEMOD mnicrosimulation model (Falk;ngham and Lessof, 1991,
1992) of the UK used  in  this  paper.  The fourth  section  of the  paper  presents  the
results  of a large  simulation  modelling  exercise, first  looking at the  distributional
outcomes  of pay-as-you-go  systems,  then  looking  at funded  pension  systems,  and
finally examining some hybrid  systems.  The final section summarizes  the results  cf
2the simulation modelling  exercise and  suggests  some policy implications.
2. Categories of pension  systems
Pension systems can be designed  and  ope:ated  to achieve a -wide  diversity  o)f  goals,
not all of them closely related  to income  security in old age.  Examples can be found
of pension  systems set up  to redistribute  income, raise saving rates, provide  cheap
loans  to the government or  to reward  political  loyalty.  From the perspective  of the
individual, however,  the  major  purpose  of  a  pension  system  is  to  effect  an
intertemporal  transfer of income  from  years  of employment  to years of retirement,
with  the  objective of improving  the  correspondence  between  the lifetime  income
profile and the lifetime expenditure  profile.  The target level of intertemporal  income
transfer  will  vary  according  to  personal  preference  and  economic capacity,  but
minimum  and maximum targets  can be determined  in relation to retirement  income.
The  minimum  degree  of  intertemporal  income  transfer  is  that  which  provides  a
retirement  income  just  sufficient  to  prevent  (socially/culturally  defined)  abject
poverty  in old age, the maximum  is that  which provides  a retirement income at tne
same level as that received before retirement.  Where pre-retirement  income is itself
below some poverty  threshold,  the minimum  condition  dominates the maximum.
In a simple funded  pension system,  this intertemporal  transfer occurs transparently
through  the accumulation by each  worker  of a personal  capital fund  which  is used
to  produce  an  income  stream  after  retirement.  Such  a  system  is  highly
individualistic,  with interpersonal  transfers often confined to the actuarially fair gains
and  losses that are a necessary element of any pension annuity scheme.  In a flat-rate
public pay-as-you-go scheme, by contrast, the contributions  of the current population
of workers  pay  for the  pensions  of  the  current  population  of pensioners.  Public
pensions  of this type rest on an implicit  contract between generations to maintain  the
tax-transfer pension system.  This type of pension system is typically viewed as being
h.ghly  rollective for two reasons.  First,  flat-rate  pensions based on flat-rate  payroil
intributicr  -e redistributive  towards  people  with  substantial  time  out  of  the
labour  force and  co wi.h  low  or  zero  lifetime  incomes  (graduated  contributions
obviously  increase  the  degree  of  redistribution).  Secondly,  the  implicit
3intergenerational  transfer contract  necessarily binds as-yet unborn  generations  to the
pension  system, since for the system  to be sustained  they will have to agree  to pay
for the pensions of current  generations  of workers.
In a public  pay-as-you-go  pension  system  individuals  never  directly pay  for their
own pension.  But this does not  necessarily  mean that there is a great deal of inter-
personal redistribution  in such a pension  system; it may be the case that, over the life
course, individuals  get out of the pension  system roughly what they put  into it.  The
nature  of  the  intergenerational  contract  on  which  public  pay-as-you-go  pension
systems  are  based  makes  it  difficult  to  disentangle  the  life-time  extent  of inter-
personal compared with intra-personal  transfers.  The intra-personal  (across the same
individual's  life-course) transfer  effects of public pensions are not transparent  as they
are with individualistic funded  pension schemes, but this does not mean that they are
inconsequential.  Below we report  some simulation  results which show the extent to
which a pay-as-you-go public pension  system  can bring about intra-personal  as well
as interpersonal  life-time transfers.
Pure  public pay-as-you-go  or private  funded  pension  systems can be thought  of as
being at opposite  ends of a spectrum  of pension  types, and many  countries  operate
some sort of hybrid  system.  Many pay-as-you-go  public pension  systems combine
earnings-related  pensions  with  minimum  pension  thresholds.  They  do  this  in  an
attempt  to  meet  the  objective  of  poverty  prevention  in  retirement  wvhile also
providing  scope for a degree  of income replacement  relative to the worker's  former
earnings.  Private  funded  pension  schemes  normally  have  no  minimum  pension
thresholds  -poverty  prevention  in old age is seen as the function of government,  not
of the  pensions  industry.  However,  public  funded  pension  systems,  such  as the
Chilean  funded  pension  system,  do  provide  minimum  pension  entitlements  for
contributors  whose  own  capital  funds  are  insufficient  to  purchase  a  minimum
pension  annuity.  Minimum  pension  entitlements  of this sort  involve  a charge  on
government  revenue,  and  this  charge  must  be included  in  any  evaluation  of the
overall cost of a public funded  pension  system.  Some of the early assessments  of the
performance  of the Chilean system,  for instance,  have paid inadequate  attention  to
4the potential long-run tax cost of providing  top-up pensions to pension  system
affiliates who have inadequate capital at retirement owing to a history of low or
discontinuous pension contributicns.  It is, of course, very difficult to estimate the
likely long-run cost of individjal  pension capital shortfall until a pension system is
mature.  In the case of Chile, aftet just eleven years of operation, the current funded
system is flush with funds o  a  -ise contributions significantly  outweigh pension pay-
outs, but in the long-run the tdx  cost of pensions for the poorer affiliates  may be high.
In the simulations presented below we make some estimates of the tax costs of top-
up pensions in order to give an indication of the potential scale of this problem.
The categorisation of pension  systernr&  by type, according to their position on a
spectrum between private  funded  and  public  pay-as-you-go, is  useful  for  the
purposes of academic  Pension  system analysis,  but from the perspective  of individual
contributors and  pensioners, criteria other than  the administrative and  financial
principles of  the system may  be  more  important.  As  already mentioned,  the
adequacy of any pension system, both in terms of poverty prevention and earnings
replacement,  is  an  imnportant  criterion,  but  equally  important  are  the
comprehensiveness  and the stability of any system. If a public tax-financed  pension
system provides limited coverage of  the  2opulation, serving only the  long-run
retireme±  t saving needs of the fully-employed, or of the high-paid, or of privileged
sub-groups such as public servants, then it will tend to effect  transfers from the poor
to the rich and fail to provide social protection at older age- for the economically
more vulnerable sections of society. This is a criticism that can be levelled at many
tax-financed  pension systems for the military and civil  servants. Comprehensiveness
is a necessary attribute of any public pension system which has, as one of its goals,
the prevention of poverty in old age.
A further attribute of pension systems that is sought by contributors  and pensioners
is that the income stream in retirement should be stable and secure. This is a difficult
goal to achieve in funded schemes because real rates of return vary over time and
capital n'Larkets  undergo periodic crises. Tax-financed  public pension systems at first
sight appear to offer better prospects of stability because the r'sks associated with
5economic  uncertainty  can  be  spread  by  government  across  all  individuals  and
economic sectors.  In practice, however,  public pay-as-you  go pension systems have
displayed substantial instability over time, with recurrent  changes to contribution and
replacement rates, eligibility rules and taxation policies.  When public pay-as-you-go
pension systems are immature,  with few beneficiaries  and many contribtutors, these
changes can consistently  be in a liberalising direction;  this was the experience in all
developed  countries  in  the  1950s, 60s and  70s.  Systers  maturity,  howep er, hias
imposed financidl discipline, and changes are now more often aimed at retrenchment.
Retrenchmnent involves  reneging  on  some  of  the  promises  offereo'.  in  the  implicit
pension  contract, and  this may  involve political costs; proposals  put forward  in ihe
fall of  1992 in  Italy  to  reduce  future  public  pernsion levels  as  part  of  a  general
austerity  package brought  thousands  of pensioners  onto  the streets in protest.  The
modelling  exercise that we carry out below  exarrdnes the life-cycle earnings  profiles
of individuals,  ai-td  assumes pension system stability.  This is a strong assumption, but
a necessary  one for comparisons  to  be made  between  the  outcomes  generated  by
different  pension  systems.
3. The LIFEMOD microsimulation model
i) Why a modelling  approach
The previous section discussed  e -ange of different pension systems. To ful.y evaluate
the distributional  implications  of these different  schemes it is necessary not only to
look  at  the  annual  costs  and  benefits,  but  also  to  exam.r.2  the  impact  over  an
individual's  entire life-cycle. How well do  the various  schemes  meet the criteria of
adequacy,  comprehensiveness,  and  stability  identified  (along  with  distributional
tiansparency)  above. Are  certain  types  oi  schemes  more  efficient at redistributing
resources  from one point  in a person's  life-time to another  i.e. from periods of time
when  individuals  are in employment  to times when  they are not. Which groups  of
people will fail to build  up adequate  contribution  records or accumulate a sufficient
personal  retirement  fund? How large will the shortfall be? How much redistribution
between  individuals  will  be necessary to ensure a guaranteed  minimum pension given
the  diversity  of labour  market  experiences,  non-waged  caring  responsibilities  and
other demographic  characteristics  etc.?
6To answer  such questions  we require  information  on a range  of characteristics not
just  at  one  point  in  t4rme but  across  the  entire  life-cycle. No  such  source  of
longitudinal  data  exists.  Evei.  where  longitudinal  surveys  have  been  carried  out
(Medical Research Council  'Dou"las  cohort';  National  Child  Development  Survey;
OPCS Longitudinal  Survey,  Michigan  Pane!  Study  of Income  Dynamics  (Duncan,
1984, Elder,  1935)) the  inforrn.ition  is  onlv  for periods  witlin  the  life course, not
complete  life histories.  EconowLists  have  frequently  attempted  to estima'e  lifetime
profiles  or functions  using  a range  of econ  metric and  simulation  techniques  (e.g.
Blinder, 174;  Lillard, 1977). While such  approaches  have  shed  light on particular
aspects of life"ime profiles, they have all failed to a greater or lesser extent to capture
the  enormous  degree  of Onange in the  circumstances  of individuals  over time. For
example,  plotting  the  lifetime  earnings  profile  of  married  me,, fails  to  take  into
account that very few men stay cc,nstantly married  and constantly in the labour force
for their entire lives. It is precisely these changes in marita,  and employment statuses
that are of particular  importance  in determrining an individual's  ability to accumulate
pension  entitlements  over  their  working  life.  Ignoring  the  degree  of  change  in
personal  circumstances  when  attempting  to provide  a picture  of lifetime welfare is
thus a critical omission.
An alternative  modelling  option  which endeavours  to incorporate  the diversity and
constant  change  in  the  circumstances  of  individuals  over  time  lies  in  dynamic
microsimulation  models.  Microsimulation  is the synthetic  generation  of data  about
social and  economic 'micro'  units. There  are three  major  types of microsimulation
models:  static  models;  dynamic  population  models;  and  dynamic  cohort  models
(Merz, 1991). The type of simriulation  model  which is applicable is depelndent on the
question  which needs  to be .. ,swered.
Static models  are  used  for estimating  the immediate  impact  of policy changes  by
systematically varying certain behavioral  relations and/or  institutional  conditions of
a microdata  base. Perhaps  the best known  examples  of static models are those first
develorned in  the US such  as  the  TRIM (TRansfer Income  Model) (Sulvetta, 1976)
which is used  to investigate  the impact of changes to payroll taxes and  to both State
7and  Federal income taxes, and TAXSIM - the tax policy analysis model developed  at
NBER (Feldstein,  1983). Such models  take  as  their  nucrodata  base  cross-sectional
information  on a representative  sample of the population  of a country e.g. TAYMOD
at  the  LSE is based  on  data  from  the  Family  Expenditure  Survey (Atkinson  and
Sutherland,  1988).
L)ynamic Population  models  also  take  a  sample  of  tht  population  as  their  initial
microdata  base.  However,  in  this  instance  the  sample  is  then  projected forward
through  time. Each microunit  of the sample  is aged  individually  by an empirically
based  survivorship  probability  (Merz,  1991). In  addition,  the  occurrence  of other
demographic  events  may  be  simulated.  For  example,  a  family  unit  cou.ld  be
diminished  ir size through  divorce or augmented  through  the birth of a child during
the simulation  process. By the process of dynamic  demographic  ageing the size of the
cross-section  under  investigation  will be altered.  Dynamic  population  models such
as DYNASIM (Orcut+ et al, 1976) are therefore  particularly  useful for forecasting the
future  characteristics  of the populatiort  and  thus  for modelling  the effects of policy
change  over +he longer period.
Dynamic  Cohort  models  employ  the  same  dynamic  ageing  process as population
models.  However  the microdata  base  is not underpinred  by  the characteristics of a
real samn.ple  unit but rather the simulation  process itself creates 'svnthetic' microunit's
and  forecasts the whole life-cycle from birth  to death. The advantage of this type of
micro-simulation  is the availability of information  for complete  life histories for each
cohort member. In contrast, dynamic population  modelc typically produce incomplete
life-histories,  mapping  only  a few decades  of the  lives  of individuals  from many
different  age groups  (althougn,  the same  lifetime profiles  could be generated  using
a  dynamic  population  model  where  the  microunit  is  children  aged  0  and  the
simulation  period 100 yeais!). Dynamuc cohort models  are thus particularly suitable
for addressing  questions  concerned  with  life-times  and  the life-cycle; for example,
accumulation  of  public  and  private  pension  rights.  This  paper  thus  relies  on  a
dynamic cohort microsimulation model -LIFEMOD - to provide the longitudinal  data
necessary.
8ii) LIFEMOD
LIFEMOD is  an  example  of dynamic  cohort  microsimulation,  simulating  the  life
histories  of a cohort of 2000 males and  2000 females. Each individual  is born in the
same year and is followed from birth through  to death, experiencing major life events
such  as  schooling,  marriage,  childbirth,  children  leaving  home,  employment  and
retirement  as illustrated  in Figure  1. There is no  immigration  or emigration into or
out of the cohort, and the only way in which  the cohort changes size is from attrition
dup to mortality.
Ageing of the cohort is achieved through  explicit modelling  of the demographic  and
socio-economic  process.  Because  the  attributes  of  each  person  at  time  t+1 are
determined  using the attributes at time t, the cohort is aged 'dynamically'  rather than
'statically'.  This ageing is based on the probabilities  of the various demographic and
other  transitions  occurring. These probabilities  are estimated  from official statistics,
sample  surveys  and other data  sources. Transitions  between  various states are then
simulated  by  using  the  relevant  probabilities  allied  with  Monte  Carlo  selection
processes.
A  randomly  generated  number  ranging  from  0  to  1,  drawn  from  a  uniform
distribution,  is assigned  to the record  of each individual  for every year (up to, and
including,  year 95). Taking mortality  experience  as an illustration,  if the randomly
generated  number  attached  to an individual  is less than the probability of dying in
that  year, given  the  age and  sex of  the person,  then  the individual  dies  and  their
records  are  terminaced.  For example,  the death  rate  for males aged 20 in  1985 was
0.93 per  1000. Since the  random  numbers  are  exactly  uniformly  distributed,  two
cohort males will be selected to die at age 20. However,  where the random  number
exceeds  or equals  the mortality  probability,  the person  survives to the next year of
life. In this way,  they become part of the pool  'at risk of death'  in the following year
where  they are subject to the same procedure  (with a new probability of death and
different  random  numbers).
A similar  approach  is adcpted,  for  example,  for  entry  into  the 1-bour-force. The
9FIGURE  1: Structure of LIFEMOD
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10'ransition  probability for any woman  is dependent  on her age, gender, the age of her
youngest  child, her previous  labour market  status,  education level and so on. In this
instance, once an individual  has been selected  to be employed via the Monte  Carlo
process, additional characteristics such as wage or unearned income are subsequently
generated  using a regression equation.
The LIFEMOD cohort is 'born'  into, and subsequently  lives in, a world that looks like
1985. Although  the steady state assumption  results  in a highly stylized 'population'
it  nevertheless  provides  a  useful  benchmark  against  which  current  government
policies, and changes to those policies, can be evaluated.  As Summers noted  in 1956,
the instability of the size of the distribution  of income makes data about the lifetime
income  distribution  in  the  past  of  little  help  in  analyzing  the  lifetime  income
distribution  of today,  while  the  future  distribution  of income is unknown  (1956).
Summers  saw great potential  in  the  construction  of steady-state or 'latent'  income
distributions  which  would  allow  one  to  answer  questions  about  lifetime income
distribution  given  existing economic  conditions.  The  steady  state  world  is  also
assumed  in other dynamic cohort models,  such as the Australian HARDING (1990b),
the Canadian DEMOGEN (Wolfson, 1990) and the West German SFB3  models (Galler
and  Wagner, 1986).
It is important  to note that one effect of this steady state assumption is that the model
results  are  affected by  the  considerable  age,  cohort  and  period  effects which  are
inherent  in  the  transition  probabilities  applied.  Several classic examples  of these
effects  exist.  One  is  that  model  projections  of  marriage  and  fertility  may
underestimate  lifetime rates  because  of  the  current  trend  to delay the  age  of first
marriage.  Similarly lifetime education  experience  may be overestimated, combining
the higher rate of entry into tertiary education  for 18 year olds in 1985, with  those of
mature  students  who  did  not  have  the  opportunity  when  they were  18 but  are
'returning'  to education in the  1980s.
Throughout  the model it should  be appreciated  that this is a hypothetical  population;
the model shows what the population  would look like if age-gender specific mortality
11rates remained at the 1985 levels -.ntil the year 2080 (i.e. for 95 years) rather that what
the population  did look like in 1963. This is of particular  importance when the model
is used for cross-sectional analysis, although  it should be borne in mind that even for
lifetime analysis the cohort experience  does not reflect a 'real'  lifetime.
It is also important  to point out  that the micro unit which LIFEMOD simulates  is the
individual  rather  than  the  family  or  th  household,  and  therefore  it  is  only  the
characteristics of the cohort individuals  themselves  that are modelled. For example we
have  no  comprehensive  information  on  the  children  of each  cohort  memb  .;t
simply  their  age, parity,  and  whether  or  not  they  are  participating  in  fu:  -.
education  (that  is,  whether  or  not  they  are  classified  as  dependent  chi;..  ..
LIFEMOD  does  not  contain  detailed  information  about  the  wider  househo'u
composition of cohort members,  unlike other  micro-simulation  models such as that
developed  at Tilburg University  (Nelissen, 1987).
Figure  2
Distribution  of Earnings  by Age,  1985
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12Figure  2 illustrates  how  the  age-specific  average  full-time  male  earnings  of the
LIFEMOD cohort compare with those of the actual 1985  cross-section drawn from the
New Earnings Survey.  The age-earnings profiles are very similar, although earnings
at older ages in the LIFEMOD cross-section are consistently above those in the NES.
This  reflects  the  higher  educational  achievement  of  the  LIFEMOD population
compared with the actual UK working  population  in 1985. Both sets of earnings data
show a decline from age 50, and so exhibit the hump-shaped  pattern  typical of :ross-
section age-earnings profiles.  Note that both these profiles refer to males in full-time








16-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45--i9  50-54  55- 59  60-B4
W  ales with  any employment  per year
Mmales  with  52 weeks of employment per-  year-
13In the analysis below, the results  from the model  are used  in three different ways:
(a)  the position  of each individual  in each year  they are alive (from age 16) can
be treated  as a separate  observation  (giving 234,000 of them) and the results
analyzed as if they represented  a cross-section  through  a population of all ages.
(b)  Earnings, contributions  and pension  receipts can be totalled over all years of
each individual's  life to give results  for their lifetime distributional  effects
In both  (a) and  (b) we assume  that in our steady state world  the real rate of return
to  capital  is  equal  to  the  rate  of real  earnings  growth  at  zero.  Therefore we can
compare the cross-section population  protiles  to the lifetime cohort profiles in order
to  examine  the  distributional  impact  of  PAYG pensions.  Because of the  current
nature  of  PAYG financing,  with  this  year's  contributions  paying  for this  year's
pensions,  the  costings  need  to  be  carried  out  on  a  constant  price  basis.  This  is
particularly  important  in any assessment  of the lifetime interpersonal  transfer effects
of a PAYG system.  The imposition  of earnings  growth  on these calculations would
inevitably  make it appear  that almost everyone  was a lifetime gainer from a PAYG
system.  The assumption  of zero earnings  growth  has the same effect as applying  a
discount  rate equal to the rate of real earnings  growth  to past PAYG contributions.
(c)  Again earnings  etc. are totalled  over the lifetime but now the parameters  are
altered to incorporate divergent  rates of real interest rate and earnings growth.
Figure 4 shows the pattern  of average male full-time earnings growth over the
life-cycle on the basis of three different rates  of real earnings growth.  We are
only  able  to  introduce  earnings  growth  because  we  abstract  from  the
remaining  components  of the  social security  system  i.e. other  cash benefits
which  are  payable  during  the  earlier  phases  of the  life course.  Implicitly,
therefore,  we  are  assuming  that  the  system  of  pension  entitlement
accumulation  is separate and independent  of the system of poverty alleviation.
Because of the introduction  of interest  rates and  earnings  growth, there is no
analogous cross-sectional population  available for comparison to the cohort as
any cross-section drawn  from the simulation  would  suffer from period effects
consequent  on the  rate of real earnings  growth.  Results embodying  positive
real  rates  of return  take account  of the  'historic'  nature  of any  individual's
accumulated  pension  capital  and  are  used  to  assess  the  pattern  of  asset
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contribution  is set to be actuarially neutral  for the cohort as a whole, providing  a flat
rate  pension  of  33  percent  of  average  full-time  male  earnings  (the  required
contribution  rate in  this case is 15% of earnings).  In the LIFEMOD cross-section (as
in  any  cross-sectional analysis  of  PAYG pensions)  there  is  necessarily a  flow  of
resources from young to old. However, over a lifetime in this steady state worli  there
are no flows between generations  as the lifetime contributions  and lifetime benefits
of each birth cohort are identical. This does not however  imply that there is no inter-
personal  redistribution  of resources,  but  rather  that  when  redistribution  occurs, it
does  so between  members  of the  same  cohort.  Twenty  percent of the  LIFEMOD
cohort die before reaching retirement  age  (61% of these  are men, 39% women).  By
definition,  these individuals  are losers, i.e. tax > benefits, but their losses mean that,
of those who  survive  to age 65, 60% are  net  beneficiaries  from the PAYG pension
system, and  only 40% are net  taxpayers.  Those who  survive  to retirement  age (65)
on average receive benefits that total nearly  twice the amount  of contributions made.
Table 1
Lifetime redistribution effects steming  from flat-rate PAYG pension
Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5
ALL  Ratio  4.29  2.00  1.31  .94  .61
(ben/contrib)
MEN  Ratio  3.82  1.52  1.16  .86  .59
(ben/contrib)  I  I  I  _I
WOMEN  Ratio  4.31  2.12  1.50  1.13  .76
(ben/contrib)  l
Table 1 shows the ratio of benefits received  to contributions  paid to individuals  who
have  survived  to age 65, ranked  (both  for the  whole  population  and  for men and
women separately) by quintile of lifetime earnings.  Women experience a higher ratio
of lifetime benefits than men in the same quintile.  Unsurprisingly  those persons with
the lowest lifetime earnings receive the highest  ratio of benefits to contributions. This
holds  within  the sexes. Thus  PAYG has  the  effect of redistributing  resources  from
men to women  and from rich to poor.
16The clearest characteristic of net lifetime beneficiaries from this PAYG  pension system
is gender;  women are more than twice as likely as men to gain from the system, with
81% of surviving  womnen  but only 37% of surviving  men being net beneficiaries.  The
disproportionate  gains of women  are a consequence  of lower lifetime tax payments
due  to lower  lifetime earnings,  and  higher  lifetime  benefits because  of higher  life
expectancy.  The  average  age  of  death  among  net  beneficiaries  is  82.5  years,
compared  with  73.2 years  for net  taxpayers.  Table  2 shows,  for all people  who
survive  to  age  65 and  for  males  and  females  separately,  the  socio-demographic
characteristics of net beneficiaries and  net losers from this simple PAYG scheme.
Table 2
Socio-economic characteristics  from LIFEMOD of lifetime net beneficiaries and net
taxpayers in a simple  PAYG pension  scheme
ALL SURVIVORS
Characteristics  Net  Net
Ben  Tax
Age of death  82.5  73.2
Ever lone parent(%)  27.7  10.1
Ever divorced  (%)  36.2  37.2
Years divorced  8.8  5.6
Years tertiary  educ.  0.9  1.4
Years of unemployment  3.8  4.1
Years of employment  30.9  37.0
17MIALE  SURVIVORS
Characteristics  Net  Net
Ben  Tax
Age of death  82.7  73.7
Ever lone parent(%)  1.6  1.4
Ever married  (%)  82.5  89.3
Ever divorced  34.5  36.6
Years divorced  6.3  4.8
Years tertiary educ.  0.73  1.4
Years of unemployment  6.9  4.8
Years of employment  35.3  38.5
FEMALE SURVIVORS
Characteristics  Net  Net
Ben  Tax
Age  of death  82.8  71.5
Ever lone parent(%)  38.3  35.6
Ever married  (%)  93.0  92.2
Ever divorced  36.9  39.0
Years divorced  9.8  8.2
Years tertiary educ.  1.0  1.5
Years of unemployment  2.5  1.9
Years of employment  29.1  32.4
From the first panel of Table 2 it is clear that longevity, lone parenthood,  a low level
of tertiary  education and a history  of relatively  low participation in the labour  force
are  all characteristics of net beneficiaries  from the PAYG system.  When the data  is
divided  by sex, in the second and  third  panels, it becomes clear that lone parenthood
is not a significant factor within  each gender  group,  and that that although men are
more likely to be net taxpayers if married  (cross-sectional surveys show married  men
18to  have  higher  earnings  than  unmarried  men),  women  are more  likely to  be net
beneficiaries if married (because of an increased  probability of uearin,- children).  For
men  to stand  a high chance of being net beneficiaries from this flat-rate tax-financed
PAYG pension  system, they need  to be ill-educated  and long-lived.
The  results  described  above  concern  only  the  simplest  steady  state  case  where
eligibility for a pension is dependent  solely  upon  chronological age. The majority  of
PAYG pensions  also incorporate  some  additional  eligibility criteria, usually  related
to  a  minimum  level  and/or  duration  of  contributions.  The  array  of  possible
contribution  conditions is almost  unlimited.  Here we h,.'  confined the simulation
exercise to modelling  2 main  variations.  It is assumedt that individuals  who  fail to
meet  the  contribution  requirements  receive  a reduced  flat-rate pension  of half the
level of the basic pension (i.e. 16.5 per  cent of average full-time male earnings).
Contribution  condition assumptions
Condition 1 To qualify for a full flat rate pension  the cohort individuals have  to fulfil
the requirement  at least 20 years worth  of contributions  (i.e. 1040 weeks). A degree
of  contribution  record  protection  is  afforded  for  women  with  unpaid  home
responsibilities  due to child care. In any year where  a woman is not in receipt of any
earnings  and  has  a child  aged  under  five  years  of age  then she is automatically
credited  with  a full year's  contributions.
Condition 2 It is more  common  to have  contribution  conditions  that combine both
duration  and level of contribution. Now  entitlement  is assumed to depend on having
20 years  of contribution where  in each year  the minimum  level of contribution  is at
least  one  third  of  the  expected  contribution  made  by  an  average  full-time  male
employee. The same system of contribution  protection  for non-working women with
young  children  applies.  This  is  similar  in  principle  to  the  Home  Responsibility
Protection  (HRPU)  scheme currently  operating  in Britain where women who  do not
work  during  a  complete  fiscal year  and  who  are  in  receipt  of child  benefit  are
ascribed  a full contribution  year.
The introduction  of a contribution  condition  dependent  solely upon duration  makes
19little  c6'fference to  pension  receipt.  Ninety-rine  percent  of  men  and  ninety-four
percent  of women who survive  to retirement  age at 65 have made contributions  in
at least 1040 weeks of their  working  lives. Thus the mean level of pension  received
is barely affected, and  only  0.9% of people  who were net beneficiaries become net
tax-payers. However, when duration  is combined with a minimum  leVel of required
contribution,  this has  the  effect  of  excluding  a  much  greater  number  of people.
Ninety-seven  percent of men  continue  to  qualify  for a full  pension,  but  only  two
thirds  (67%)  of women do despite  HRP. Because HRP only applies to complete years
this has the effect of penalising  women  with  young children who take a low paid job
for part of the year. Such women may find themselves in the position where they lose
their  HRP credit and fail to make  sufficient  contributions  whilst working  to qualify
as a contribution year.
The introduction of contribution  conditions  significantly affects who are the winners
and  losers.  Table 3 shows the proportion  of men and women who, by any age, have
a contribution  record sufficient  in terms  of duration  (C1) or duration  and level (C2)
to meet the minimum contribution  requirements  set out above.
Table  3
Proportion  of  men and women  who  qualify  for PAYG pension  under different
contribution  rules, by various  ages  and  lifetime  maxital status.
NEVER MARRIED  EVER MARRIED
Men  Women  Men  Women
cl  C2  C1  C2  C1  C2  C1  C2
35-39  14.1  9.7  10.9  4.0  14.7  10.2  12.2  2.7
40-44  53.3  43.2  33.3  21.6  55.1  48.5  47.6  15.4
45-49  76.2  68.6  53.3  38.9  82.9  76.9  69.4  28.5
50-54  87.8  81.8  63.6  49.4  94.0  90.4  82.6  41.8
55-59  92.3  87.3  74.3  6C.8  97.6  95.5  1  89.5  54.2
60-64  94.8  89.2  84.3  70.7  99.0  97.8  93.6  64.6
As expected, most men reach  the duration  threshold under Condition I by their mid-
40s,  because  of  their  propensity  to  work  full-time.  Women  accumulate  their
20contribution  record more slowly, but  even so the great majority reach the minimum
level by age 65.  Although  never-married  women  have more years of employment
(and  so  of  contribution)  than  ever-  married  women,  the  home  responsibility
protection  condition  allows  iLtore ever-married  women  to  meet  the  necessary
minimum  number  of  contributions  than  never-married  women  at  any  age.  The
combination  of  mninimum duration  and  minimum  level of  contribution  required
under  Condition  2 is more difficult  to meet, particularly  for women because  much of
their employment  is low-paid  and  part-time.  Fewer than two-thirds  of all women
now meet the minimumrr  pension  qualification  requirements.  Ever-married  women
are affected more because they are more  likely than never-married  women  to work
part-time, and therefore many of them fail to make an adequate level of contribution
despite  satisfying the duration  conidition.
joint  contributions
So  far  we  have  only  examined  PAYG  systems  that  are  based  exclusively  on
individuals'  own contribution records.  However, in many countries there is provision
for joint treatment  of married  or cohabiting  couples.  Under our joint  contribution
rule, we assume that the recorded  duration  and level of pension contribution  by both
partners  is split  equally,  as  is  the  HRP  protection  if received  by  a  non-working
mother.  Table 4 reports  the outcomes  for ever-married  individuals  (never-married
individuals  cannot, by definition,  experience  contribution  sharing).
21Table 4
Proportion of ever-married men and women who qualify for PAYG  pension under
different contribution rules with contribution-sharing, by various ages.
Men  Women
C1  C2  C1  C2
35-3')  8.6  9.2  10.2  7.8
40-44  50.8  48.7  49.1  41.8
45-49  81.9  77.3  75.9  67.7
50-54  94.1  90.3  88.3  82.0
F:3  59  =  97.7  95.0  93.6  88.6
60-64  99.0  97.4  96.4  92.1
Table 4 can be directly compared  with  the right-hand  half of table 3; the differences
are the direct outcome of contribution  sharing.  The impact on ever-married  men is
minimal; under  both Condition 1 and Cjndition 2, men have such an excess of weeks
and  amount  of contributions  above the minimum  qualifying  level that sharing with
their  partners  .s virtually  costless.  For  women,  on  the other  hand,  the  sharing  of
contributions  has an enormous  effect on their ability to qualify under  the joint level
and  duration  requirements  of  Ccndition 2.  The  outcome  from  any  contribution
sharing  rule will depend  crucially  on the  minimum  pension  qualifying conditions.
As the minimum duration and level of contributions  is raised, so contribution sharing
will  become  more  costly  for  men,  more  of  whom  will  fail  to  qualify,  and  less
beneficial for women, fewer of whom will be brought  up to the minimum threshold.
This example shows, therefore, that contribution  sharing can have a significant effect
on outcomes in any PAYG pension system  that has minimum  qualifying conditions.
Intergenerational  PAYG transfers
If we relax the assumption  that  fertility  and  mortality  (and  so the contributor  and
beneficiary populations)  remain  constant  but  assume  that  the pension replacement
rate oa  remains the same, then  the tax rate must necessarily  change.  It is just such a
change in the ratio of contributors  to beneficiaries over the next three decades  as the
22baby-boomers  enter retirement  that has raised  concern in many developed countries
about  the long-run  cost of pay-as-you  go public pensions.  A stylised example for a
hypothetical  unfunded  pension  system  in a static economy is illustrated  in Table 5.
In this example the first cohort (A) contains two people,  and population  grows over
the next six generations before beginning  to decline.  Members of each generation live
for two periods;  the first is a time of work  and  pension  contribution,  the second a
time of retirement and of receipt of pension benefit.  Each member of each generation
contributes  £10 to  the social security  system  while  working,  and  each generation
draws  a pension funded  from the contributions  of its successor generation (cohort B
pays  for  cohort  A's  pensions,  C  pays  for  B, D  for  C,  and  so  on).  When  the
population  is  growing  each  generation  enjoys  pension  benefits  greater  than  its
pension  contributions,  so the value of benefits is always  higher than the individual
contributions  of £10 made  during  working  life.  Larger  gains  are enjoyed by  the
earlier cohorts because of their small size relative to the working population, and the
greatest gains are captured  by the initial generation  which pays no contributions but
receives  windfall  benefits.  However,  when  population  begins  to  decline  (from
generation  G) the pension  funds  available  for each generation  become smaller than
that generation's net contribution  when working; per capita contributions now exceed
benefits.  When  the  transfer  chain is increasing  everyone  gains as each generation
receives  back  more  than  it  pays  in,  but  when  the  transfer  chain  is  decreasing
everyone  loses.
Table 5
The contributions and benefits of successive cohorts in a hypothetical pay-as-you-
go pension system
Cohort  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K
Cohort  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  7  6  5  4
size
Contrib  0  30  40  50  60  70  80  70  60  50  40
Contrib  0  1(  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10
p.c.
Benefits  30  40  5(  60  70  80  (  _70  60  50  40  30
Benefits  15  13.3  12.5  12.0  11.7  11.4  8.75  8.57  8.33  8  7.5
23A demographically-induced  intergenerational  redistribution  of the type illustrated  in
table 5 is a potentially  important  consequence  of  a pay-as-you-go  pension  system
operating  under  unstable demographic  conditions,  but  we do not attempt  to model
it in this paper.  As explained above, dynamic  cohort microsimulation models forecast
the whole life-cycle of one generation from birth to death, and so do not readily allow
for successive  generations  with  different  demographic  characteristics.  We think  it
may be possible to develop a stacked  dynamic  cohort model which would  allow at
least two successive generations to be modelled  simultaneously,  but this is uncharted
territory  and  is beyond  the scope of this  paper.  A second  reason for avoiding the
intergenerational  transfer issue is that it necessarily  requires  policy judgements  to be
made  about how to pay for the transfers  - do taxes rise, or pension replacement rates
fall?  As noted  in section 1, we assume pension  system  stability in all our reported
simulations, but system stability is not consistent  with a shift in demographic ratios.
ii) Funded pension systems
Any simulation  of the distributional  consequences  of a funded  pension system must
necessarily  rest  on  a  number  of  demographic,  financial  and  administrative
assumptions.  Before discussing the simulation  modelling e .ercise, we will outline the
range  of  assumptions  we  have  used  and  indicate  what  we  think  are  the  more
plausible  scenarios.  The modelling  of a funded  pension system can logically be split
irLo  two  parts  - the  accumulation  of  a capital  fund  during  working  life, and  the
decumulation  of  this  fund  during  retirement.  The  process  of  accumulation  is
modelled  in  LIFEMOD, but  the  decumulation  is  based  on  a  simple  annuity
calculation.
Annuity  calculations
For the sake  of simplicity we assume  that  all individuals  at retirement purchase  an
annuity  with  the pension capital that they have accumulated.  We do not model any
alternative  way of using the capital, such as some form of regulated spend-down,  as
is allowed in the public funded  pension  systems in Chile and Singapore.  There is no
reason  in principle  to prevent  the modelling  of spend-down  systems, but  to  do so
requires  the formulation  of spend-down  rules which  are likely to be more arbitrary
24than the assumption  of annuity  purchase.  For the annuity  calculations, we make the
following  simplifying  procedural  assumptions:
- that all individuals  are born on  1 January  and  die on 31 December, so that
chronological  age and  calender  years coincide
- that retirement occurs on 31 December before the retirement age birthday (i.e.
retirement  at 65 means retirement  occurs on 31 December of the 64th year of
life)
- that pensions  are paid  in an annual  lump  sum  on 1 January of each year;
- that interest  on the  capital sum  is earned  in  a lump  sum  on 31 December
each year
We assume that the financial institutions  that sell annuities  charge a lump-sum 4 per
cent purchase  conrimission on capital which  is a combination  of risk premium  and
admninistration fee.  This figure  is representative  of premia  charged  in the  British
annuity  market.  These financial institutions  are assumed  to work in a capital market
in  which  a stable real rate  of return  of either  2% or 3% or  4% per  annum  can be
earned.  The long-run real rate of return  in the UK is estimated  to be around 3%, and
the range  from 2% to 4% covers most plausible scenarios.  Higher real rates of return
could substantially  reduce the contribution  cost of any particular  target pension level.
The first  decade  of experience in the Chilean  funded  pension  system has produced
an average  annual  real rate  of return  of  12.6%/O,  with  a range  from 2.9% to 26.5%
(Gillion and  Bonilla, 1992: 179). However,  these reported  returns  have been biased
upwards  by the enormous devaluation  of the Chilean currency over the same period;
had  the  funds  been  invested  in  US fixed  interest  stock, higher  pension payments
could  have  been  generated  despite  apparently  lower  real  rates  of return  on  the
investments  (Scarpaci and Miranda-Radic,  1991:  40). We think, therefore, that the real
rates of return  relevant to the advanced  industrial  economies are the appropriate ones
to use in these simulations.
The annual  pension  that can be provided  by any  given capital sum, at any real rate
of return,  will depend  on  the  expected  length  of pensionable  life.  This is jointly
determined  by  the age of retirement  and  the average  life expectancy of the subject.
25In the  simulations  we use four alternative  ages  of retirement,  at 55, 60, 65 and  70.
Although  60 and 65 are common  retirement  ages  in many  pension schemes, 55 is
used  to indicate  the  likely pension  cost  if  a further  decline in  the average  age  of
retirement  occurs, and 70 is used  to indicate  the pension  cost if retirement ages are
increased  to take account of past and projected improvements  in mortality experience.
We  also  use  four  average  ages  of  death,  at  80, 81, 83  and  85.  Our  annuity
calculations  are made on a gender-neutral  basis, which is calculated according In age
and gender-specific life-expectancies, which  are then weighted by the appropriate  sex
ratios  for each retirement age.  The assumption  of gender-neutrality  in the annuity
market  is  a  deviation  from  pure  actuarial  principles  and  so  implies  some
eedistribution  from men to women, but  is consistent  with European Community  sex
equality  legislation.  We produce  an average  gender  neutral  life expectancy at each
of  the  four  retirement  ages, which  then  indicates  the  average age of death  for all
people  surviving  to that retirement age.  On the basis of the 1987-8  UK life tables, the
average  age of death is as follows:





We provide  additional  annuity  estimates  for death at age 85 since these indicate the
potential  pension cost of a significant  future  improvement  in the life expectancy  of
older people.
26Table 6
Necessary annuity capital values on retirement (E 1985)
Replacement rate = 70%
Real rate of return  2% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  180545  158737  133897  106872
Die 83  171940  148874  123407  95289
Die 81  162986  138988  112493  83239
Die 80  158375  133897  106872  77033
Real rate of return  3%  p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  158969  142090  122523  99839
Die 83  152515  134608  113849  89784
Die 81  145668  126671  104648  79117
Die 80  142090  122523  99839  73542
Real rate of return  4% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die  85  141156  128269  112590  93515
Die 83  136302  122364  105406  84774
Die 81  131052  115977  97635  75319
Die  80  128269  112590  93515  70306
Replacement rate = 50%
Real rate of return  2% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  128961  113125  95641  76337
Die 83  122814  106338  88148  68064
Die 81  116419  99277  80352  59457
Die 80  113125  95641  76337  55024
Real rate of return  3% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  113549  101493  87516  71313
Die 83  108939  96149  81321  64131
Die 81  104049  90479  74748  56512
Die 80  101493  87516  71313  52530
Real rate  of return  4% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  100825  91620  80421  66796
Die 83  97358  87402  75290  60552
Die 81  93609  82840  69739  53799
Die 80  91620  80421  66796  50219
27Replacement  rate = 33%
Real rate of return  2% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret  60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  85114  74662  63123  50382
Die 83  81057  70183  58177  44922
Die 81  76836  65523  53032  39241
Die 80  74662  63123  50382  36315
Real rate of return  3% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  74942  66985  57760  47067
Die 83  71900  63458  53672  42327
Die 81  68672  59716  49334  37298
Die 80  66985  57760  47067  34670
Real rate of return  4% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  66544  60469  53078  44085
Die 83  64256  57685  49691  39964
Die 81  61781  54674  46028  35507
Die  80  60469  53078  44085  33144
Replacement rate = 15%
Real rate of return  2% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret  60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  38688  33937  28692  22901
Die  83  36844  31901  26444  20419
Die 81  34925  29783  24105  17837
Die 80  33937  28692  22901  16507
Real  rate  of return  3% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  34064  30447  26254  21394
Die 83  32681  28844  24396  19239
Die 81  31214  27143  22424  16953
Die 80  30447  26254  21394  15759
Real rate of return  4% p.a.
Ret 55  Ret 60  Ret 65  Ret 70
Die 85  30247  27486  24126  20038
Die 83  29207  26220  22587  18165
Die 81  28082  24852  20921  16139
Die 80  27486  24126  20038  15065
28In Table 6 we present the capital  sums  required  to purchase  gender-neutral  annuity
pensions for the array of retirement  and  death ages and real rates of return  discussed
above.  Four variants are reported,  which  relate to pension replacement  rates  equal
to 70%, 50%, 33% and  15% of the average  earnings  of fully-employed  males in the
LIFEMOD population.  The average annual  income for these men was £10598 in 1985
prices, for all males aged up  to 65.  Because earnings  vary by age, average earnings
also vary according to the retirement  age selected, but changing  this terminal  age of
earning  through  the range  from 55 to 70 alters this average earnings  figure  by less
than  1.5%.  Other  baseline  earnings  figures  could  be selected  against  which  the
pension  replacement  rates  can  be  calculated,  but  we  have  used  average  fully-
employed  male earnings  in  the  year  of retirement  because  this  is the  benchmark
against  which the current  worth  of a pension  is normally  evaluated  in both  the UK
and  other countries.  The replacement  rates  used  in Table 6 were  selected because
70% is the rate provided  by the better occupational  pension schemes, 50% is close to
the average for European public  pension  systems, 33% is the rate that is projected to
be  produced  by  the  combined  flat-rate  and  earnings-related  UK public  pension
system for a man with average life-time earnings who retires after the year 2000, and
!5% is the replacement  rate  currently  provided  by  the basic flat-rate  UK National
Insurance pension  (Atkinson, 1991).
In the annuity  calculations and  simulations  we assume full price indexation,  on the
basis  either that  there is zero inflation,  or  that asset values and  earnings  inflate at
exactly  the  same  rate.  Pensions  are  assumed  not  to  be indexed  to  real  earnings
growth.  This assumption means  that pension income falls relative to earned income
over  time, if there  is positive  real  earnings  growth.  If pensions  payments  are  to
match real earnings growth,  the required  annuity  capital value will have to rise.  Full
earnings  indexation  may  be  an  optimal  pensions  goal,  but  few  existing  funded
pension  systems  provide  even  the  full  price  indexation  incorporated  in  these
simulations
In  the simulations  reported  below  we consider  replacement  rate  targets  other  than
those  set by  reference  to  average  male  earnings  in  the year  of  retirement.  Two
29alternatives  that  feature  in  the pensions  literature  are  replacement  relative  to own
final salary and replacement  relative to own annualized  lifetime earnings.  The first
of these involves  modelling  difficulties, because  although  we know  the individual
age-earnings profiles  of LIFEMOD workers,  we do  not know  specific characteristics
of their employment.  Replacement  relative  to final salary is usually taken to mean
final full-time salary  in the primary  career  job.  In LIFEMOD we cannot determine
whether  an individual's  salary  in their final year of full-time employment is in their
primary career, or whether  they have earlier moved  to a lower-paid 'bridging job' as
part  of a phased  movement  from primary  career to retirement.  In the comparisons
we make of pensions  relative  to final salary, this salary  is based on earnings  in the
last  reported  year  of  full-time  continuous  employment  which  we  assume  to  be
representative  of primary  career earnings.
Own annualized  lifetime earnings  are easy to compute  in LIFEMOD  and can be used
as a basis for replacement  rate calculations.  Annualization  is important  because  it
takes  account  of  time  out  of  the  labour  force.  Employment  and  earnings  in
LIFEMOD are simulated  on a weekly basis; annualized  earnings for each individual
are  calculated  by  summing  all  earnings,  dividing  by  the  number  of  weeks  of
employment,  and  multiplying  by 52.  In  simulations  of PAYG pensions based  on
variant  (b) on p.14, this procedure  will give valid  rankings  of annualized  lifetime
earnings  because  the steady-state  assumptions  mean that £1 of earnings is of equal
value regardless  of the age at which it is received.  However,  if there is some positive
degree of real earnings growth  over time as in variant  (c) on p.14, then a replacement
rate  based  on average lifetime earnings  will be below  a replacement  rate based on
current  earnings  (unless earnings  fall sharply  with  age after some point) because £1
received  early in life was worth  relatively  more than £1 received  late in life.  In the
simulations  reported  below  of both  funded  and  hybrid  pension  systems, wherever
replacement  rates  are  estimated  on  the  basis  of  own  lifetime  earnings,  this  is
calculated  on  the basis of own discounted  annualized  lifetime earnings, where  the
discount  rate equals the assumed  rate of real earnings  growth.  This means that all
past  earnings  are revalued  onto a current  (year of retirement)  basis.
30Contribution  calculations
The accumulation  of individual  pension contributions  is modelled in LIFEMOD, but
in order to set some reasonable parameters  to the modelling  process, and to get some
intuitive idea of the sensitivity of results  to key assumptions,  we have first estimated
contribution  rates for the average LIFEMOD fully-employed  male worker.  Again it
is necessary  to  base  the  modelling  on  a  range  of  assumptions  about  real rates  of
return,  real earnings growth, and the age at which contributions  commence. We have
produced  estimates on the basis  of contributions  beginning  at 18, 21 and  25, to take
account of alternative  assumptions  about age of entry into the permanent  workforce.
Real earnings  growth  rates  of 0%, 1% 1.5% and  2% per annum  have been used  to
establish the lifetime earnii.gs stream.  For all four retirement  ages used, retirement
is assumed  to occur in  1985, so the age-specific level ot real earnings will vary with
the age of retirement  as well as the rate of real earnings  growth.  In Table 7 we report
the annual  contribution  rate that would  produce  a pension replacement rate of 15%,
33%, 50% and  70% for the  average  fully-employed  LIFEMOD male worker,  given
alternative  assumptions  about  contribution  age, retirement  age, age  at death,  real
earnings  growth  and real rate  of return  as applied  to both contribution  and annuity
streams.  Since  the  model  is  of  a  funded  scheme,  we  have  incorporated  some
plausible adminstration  costs which might be levied on contributors to such a pension
scheme.  We have assumed  that the whole of the first year's contribution,  and 5% of
each subsequent  year's contribution,  will be devoted  to costs of administration.  This
is equivalent  to  a reduction  in  yield  of  about  1.3%, which  is in  the mid-range  of
administration  charges currently  levied  by the British personal  pensions industry.
31Table 7
Contribution  rates required  to generate  various  pension  replacement  rates
7a: Contribution rates n eded  to  generate  a r  lacernent  rate of 15% of averae mA  adul  t  earnin2zs
dY-  0%  dY  1%  dY = 1.5%  dY =2%
Contribution  age  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  |  21  25  18  21  25
|Death
Iage__  _
Real  i  =  2%
Retire at 55  80  7  8  8  8  9  10  9  9  10  10  10  11
81  7  8  9  9  9  10  9  10  11  10  10  11
83  8  8  9  9  9  10  10  10  11  10  11  12
85  8  9  10  9  10  11  10  11  12  11  12  13
Retire at 60  80  5  5  6  6  6  7  7  7  7  7  8  8
81  5  6  6  6  7  7  7  7  8  7  8  8
83  6  6  7  7  7  8  7  8  8  8  8  9
85  6  6  7  7  7  8  8  8  9  8  9  9
Retire at 65  80  4  4  4  4  5  5  5  5  5  5  6  6
81  4  4  4  5  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  6
83  4  4  5  5  5  6  6  6  6  6  6  7
85  4  5  5  5  6  6  6  6  7  7  7  7
Retire at 70  80  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4
81  3  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
83  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  5  5
85  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  5  5  5  5  5
Real  i =  3%  ____
Retire  at55  80  5  6  7  6  7  8  7  7  8  8  8  9
81  6  6  7  7  7  8  7  8  8  8  8  9
83  6  6  7  7  7  8  7  8  9  8  8  9
_________  85  16  7  7  7  8  9  8  8  9  8  9  10
Retire at 60  80  4  4  5  5  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  I  6
___________81  4  4  5  5  5  6  5  6  6  6  6  7
--83  4  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  6  6  6  7
85  5  5  I  5  5  6  6  6  6  7  7  7  8
Retire at65  80  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  I  4  4  4  1  4  5
81  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  5  5
_____________  83  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  4  5  5  5  5
85  3  3  4  4  4  5  4  5  5  5  5  6
Retireat70  80  1  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
81  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
83  2  2  3  3  31  3  3  3  3  4  4
85  1  2  2  3  3  3  3  34  4  1
32Table  7a continued: 15% replacement rate  . l
m  lZI  dy=0%  dy = 1%_  dY.1.5%  dY2=  -
Contribution  age  18  21  25  18  |  21  25  18  21 ] 25  18  21  25
_Deathl  l
Real i = 4%  __l__  _  _
Retire at 55  80  4  5  5  5  5  6  5  6  7  6  6  7
,______  81  4  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  7  6  6  7
,___________  .83  4  5  6  5  6  6  6  6  7  6  7  7
85  5  5  6  5  6  7  6  6  7  6  7  8
Retire at 60  80  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  4  5  4  5  5
81  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  4  5  4  5  5
83  3  3  4  4  4  5  4  5  5  5  5  5
85  3  4  4  4  4  5  4  5  5  5  5  6
Retire at 65  80  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4
81  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  4
83  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4
85  2  3  3  3  3  4  3  4  4  4  4  4
Retire at 70  80  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3
.________  81  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3
83  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3
L __________  85  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
33Table 71':  Contribuition  rates needed to generate a replacement rate o~  33% of average male adut  earnings-
X  ZLZI  T  I  dYO%/1  dY = %  dY =15%  dY  ___2
Contribution  ge  is  82125  18  21  2518s211  25  18  I21  25
Real i =  2%  ____
Retire  at  55  80  i5  16  18  18  19421  1t)  20  22  21  22  24
81  16  17  19  18  19422  20  21  23  21  23  25
83  17  18  20  19)  20123  21  22  24  23  24  26
85  18  19  21  20 I21  24  22 I23  25 I24  25  27
Retire  at  60  80  1  1  1  1  13  13  14  15  14  115  lb I15  16  17
___________  81  11  12  13  13  14  15  15  lb  17  16  17  18
83  12  13  14  14  i5  16  16  16 118  17 118  19
___________  85  I12  13  15  15  16  17  17  17  19  18  19  20
Retire  at  65  83  7  8  9  9  10  10  10  11  11  11  12  12
___________  81  8  8  9  10  10  11  11  11  12  12  12  13
83  8  9  10  10  11  12  12  12 113  13 113  1
85  1  9  10  11  11 112  13  13  13  14  14  14  15
Retire  at  70  80  5  5  5  6  6  7  9  10  10  8  8  8
___________  81  5  5  6  6  7  7  10  10  11  8  8  9
___________  83  6  6  7  7  8  8  10  11 112  9  10  10
_________  85  6  7  1  7  8  8  9  11  12  13  10  11  1  1
Real  i  =  3%  _____
Retire  at  5Sf 80  11  12  14  14  15  16  15  16  18  16  17  19
____________81  12  13  151  14  15  17  15  16  18  16  17  19?
83  12  13  is  15  161  18  16  17  19  17  18  20
85  13  14  16  15  16  18  17  18  20  18  19  21
Retire  at  60  80  8  9)  10  10  10  12  11  11  13  12  12  14
___________  81  8  9  10  10 I11  12  11  12  13  12  13  14
___________  83  9  9  11  II  1  1  13  12  13  14  13  14  15
___________  85  9  10  12  12  12  14  13  13  15  14  15  16
Retire  at  65  80  6  6 1  7  7  7  81  8  8  9  9  9  10
______  ~81  6  6  7  7  8  8  8  8  9  9  9  1
___________  83  6  7  7  8  8  9  9  9)  10  10  10  I11
___________  85  7  7  9)  8  9  10  9  I10  11  10  I11  12
Retire  at  70  80  4  4 1  4  5  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  6
______  ~81  4  4  4  5  5  6  5  6  6  6  6  7
______  ~83  4  4  5  5  6  6  6  6  7  7  7  8
185  5  5  566617  7  1 
34Table 7b continued:  33% replacement  rate
I  dY = 0%  ly  =Y  - li)  _  dY = 1.5  dY = 2%
Contribution  rate  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  T  25
|Dea t
Iage_  _  _
Real i = 4%  _____
Retire at 55  80  9  10  1  - lO|1  13  11  12  14  12  13  15
81  9  _10  11  I1  12  13  12  13  14  13  14  15
83  9  10  12  11  12  14  12  13  sS  13  14  16
,  85  10  10  12  11  12  14  13  13  15  14  15  16
Retire at 60  80  6  7  8  7  |  8  9  8  9  10  9  10  11
81  6  7  8  3  8  9  8  9  10  9  10  1
83  7  7  8  8  9  10  9  10  11  10  10  12
__________  85  7  7  9  8  9  10  9  10  11  10  11  12
Retire at 65  80  4  4  5  5  6  6  6  6  7  7  7  8
81  4  5  5  5  6  6  6  6  7  7  7  8
83  5  5  6  6  6  7  7  7  8  7  8  8
85  5  5  6  6  7  7  7  7  8  8  8  9
Retire at 70  80  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  5  4  5  5
81  3  1  3  3  4  4  4  4  4  5  5  5  5
83  3  4  4  4  4  5  5  5  S  5  5  6
l85  3  4  4  _4  5  5  5  6  6  6  7
35Table  7c:  Contribution  rates  needed  to  genera  a replacement rate of 50% of average  male  adult earnings
dY =0%  dY = 1%  dY = 1.5%  dY = 2%
I~~~~~  -_  - _ 
Contribution  e  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  25
Deaith_=  _
Real i = 2%
Retire at 55  80  22  24  27  26  28-  31  29  30  33  31  33  36
81  23  25  28  27  29  32  30  31  34  32  34  37
___________  83  24  26  29  29  30  34  31  33  36  34  35  39
85  25  27  31  30  12  35  33  34  38  35  37  41
Retire at 60  80  16  17  19  19  20  22  21  22  24  23  24  26
____________  81  16  17  19  20  21  23  22  23  25  24  25  27
83  17  18  21  21  22  24  23  24  26  25  26  29
85  18  20  22  22  24  26  25  26  28  27  28  30
Retire at 65  80  11  11  13  13  13  15  15  16  17  17  17  18
81  11  12  13  14  15  16  16  16  18  17  18  19
83  12  13  14  15  16  18  17  18  19  19  20  21
85  13  14  16  17  is  19  19  19  21  21  21  23
Retire at 70  80  7  7  8  9  9  10  10  10  11  11  11  12
81  7  8  8  9  10  11  11  11  12  12  12  13
83  8  9  10  11  11  11  12  13  13  14  14  15
_  85  9  10  11  12  12  1  13  14  15  15  16  17
Real i = 3%  _______
Retire at 55  80  17  18  21  20  22  24  22  23  26  24  25  28
___________  L81  17  19  22  21  22  25  23  24  27  24  26  29
____________  83  18  20  22  22  23  26  24  25  28  26  27  30
85  1  19  211  24  23  24  27  1  25  26  29  27  28  31
Retire at 60  80  12  13  14  14  15  17  16  17  19  13  18  20
81  12  13  15  15  16  18  16  17  19  18  19  21
83  13  14  16  16  17  19  17  19  20  19  20  22
85  14  15  17  17  18  20  19  20  22  21  22  24
Retire at 65  80  8  9  10  10  11  12  1  1  12  13  13  13  14
81  8  9  10  11  11  12  12  2  14  13  14  15
83  9  10  11  11  12  13  13  14  13 1  14  15  16
85  10  10  12  12  13  14  14  15  l6  15  16  17
Retire  at  70  80  5  5  6  7  7  8  7  8  8  8  9  9
81  5  6  6  7  7  8  8  8  Q  9  _  9  10
83  6  6  7  8  8  9  9  9  10  10  1  11  11
_  85  7  1  7  8  9  9  10  10  10  11  111  12  13
36Table  7c continued:  50% replacement  rate  __
m  -j%dY=0%  dY  1%  dY=1.5%  dY=2%
Contribution  age  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  25
IDeath
Real i = 4%  l_______
Retire at 55  80  13  14  17  15  17  19  17  18  21  18  20  22
81  13  14  17  16  17  20  17  19  21  19  20  23
83  14  15  18  16  18  20  18  19  22  19  21  24
85  14  15  18  17  18  21  19  20  23  20  22  24
Retire at 60  80  9  10  1l  11  12  13  12  13  15  13  14  16
___  _81  9  10  11  11  12  14  12  13  15  14  15  16
83  10  10  12  12  13  14  13  14  16  15  15  17
85  10  11  13  12  13  14  14  15  16  15  16  18
Retire at 65  80  6  6  7  8  8  9  9  9  10  10  10  I  1
81  6  7  8  8  8  9  9  9  10  10  11  12
83  7  7  8  8  9  10  10  10  11  11  11  12
85  7  8  9  9  10  II  10  11  12  11  12  13
Retire at 70  80  4  4  5  5  5  6  6  6  7  6  7  7
81  4  4  5  5  6  6  6  6  7  7  7  8
83  4  5  5  6  6  7  7  7  8  8  8  8
_ 85  5  5  6  6  7  8  7  8  8  8  9  9
37Table 7d. Contribution rates needed to generate a rerplacemnent  rate o  700/o  of average mal  adult earnings
I  dY=  0%  dY = 1%  dY = 1.5%  dY = 2%
Contribution  25  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  25
|IDeath__
_  I  - - -
Real  i = 2%
Retire at 55  80  31  33  38  37  39  43  40  42  43  45  *
81  32  34  39  38  40  45  41  43  *  44  *  *
____________  83  34  36  *  40  42  43  _  _  _  =  _
____________  85  35  38  *  42  45  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Retireat 60  8C  22  23  26  27  28  31  29  31  33  32  33  36
81  23  24  27  28  29  32  30  32  34  33  34  37
83  24  26  29  29  31  34  32  34  37  35  37  40
85  26  27  30  31  33  36  34  36  39  38  39  42
Retire at 65  80  15  16  17  19  20  21  21  22  23  23  24  26
81  16  17  18  20  21  22  22  23  24  24  25  27
83  17  18  20  21  22  24  24  25  27  26  27  29
85  18  20  22  23  24  26  26  27  29  29  30  32
Retire at 70  80  9  10  11  12  13  14  14  14  15  15  16  17
81  10  11  12  13  14  15  15  15  16  16  17  18
83  11  12  13  15  15  17  17  17  19  19  19  21
185  13  14  15  17  17  19  19  19  21  21  22  23
Real  i  =  3%
Retire at 55  80  24  26  29  28  30  34  31  33  37  33  35  39
81  24  26  30  29  31  35  31  33  37  34  36  40
83  25  27  31  30  32  36  33  35  39  36  38  42
85  26  28  T  33  31  1  34  38  1  34  36  1  41  37  1  39  44
Retireat60  80  16  18  20  20(  21  24  22  23  26  24  26  28
81  17  18  21  21  22  25  23  24  27  25  27  29
83  18  1J9  22  22  23  26  24  T2n  28  27  28  31
85  1  19  20  23  23  1  25  27  1  26  27  1  30  28  301  32
Retireat65  80  11  12  13  14  15  16  16  16  18  17  18  20
81  12  12  14  15  16  17  16  17  19  18  19  21
83  13  13  15  16  17  19  18  11  20  20  21  23
185  13  14  16  17  18  20  IQ1  20  22  21  22  24
Retire at 70  80  7  7  8  9  9  10  10  10  |2  12  12  13
81  7  8  9  10  10  11  11  12  12  12  13  14
83  8  9  10  11  11  13  12  1  14  14  15  16
85  Q9  10  I11  1I2 __13  14  14  14  16  16  1  17
38Table  7d continued:  70% replacement  rate  _  _
llIlldIYY=  =  %  J dY  =1%  dY = 15%  dY  2%/
Contribution  ge  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21  25  18  21 1  25
Real  i = 4%  I
Retire at 55  80  18  20  23  21  23  27  23  25  29  26  28  31
81  18  20  23  22  24  27  24  26  29  26  28  32
83  19  21  24  23  25  28  25  27  30  27  29  33
85  20  21  25  24  26  29  26  28  32  28  30  34
Retire at 60  80  12  13  15  15  16  18  17  18  20  19  20  22
81  13  14  16  16  17  19  17  18  21  19  20  23
83  13  14  17  16  18  20  18  19  22  20  21  24
85  14  15  18  17  18  21  19  20  23  21  I  22  25
Retireat65  80  8  9  10  10  11  13  12  13  14  13  |  14  15
81  8  9  11  II  12  13  12  13  14  14  15  16
83  9  10  11  12  13  14  13  14  16  15  16  17
85  10  11  12  12  13  15  14  15  17  16  1  7  18
Retire at 70  80  5  5  6  7  7  8  8  8  9  9  9  10
81  5  6  7  7  8  8  1  8  9  10  9  10  11
83  6  6  7  8  8  9  9  10  11  10  11  12
85  7  7  8  9  9  I  10  10  11  12  11  1  12  13
Note:  * indicates a contribution  rate of over 45%
39Table 7 reports the required  contribution  rate relevant to 2304 different combinations
of assumptions.  All contribution  rates  have  been  rounded-up  to  the nearest  full
percentage  point.  The table shows  clearly  that higher rates of real earnings  growth
require  higher  contribution  rates  (because  of the  relative  diminution  in  value  of
contributions earlier in life) and higher real rates of return  require lower contribution
rates for any particular  target roolacement  rate, because of the faster growth  of the
capital fund.  Ihe  greater  the excess of real rate of return  over real earnings  growth,
the  lower  the  required  contribution  rate.  Higher  contribution  ages  increase  the
required  contribution rate, and  higher  retirement  ages reduce it.
The apparent  'affordability'  of any funded  pension system will depend  crucially on
the key assumptions used  in table 7, and  there is likely to be a diversity  of opinion
about  the  appropriateness  of  each.  The  mid-range  assumptions  that  seem  most
appropriate  to Britain are of a long run  real rate of return  of 3% per annum,  and of
long-run  real earnings growth  of 1.5% per  annum.  The UK Government  Actuary's
long-run  social security projections  assumne  that earnings will grow at 1.5% p.a., and
a 3% real rate of return  is consistent  with  achieved investment  returns  across two
investment  cycles from the mid 1960s to the mid-1980s (Government Actuary,  1990).
This  empirical  support  for  these  assumptions  provides  a  strong  justification  for
applying  them  to the LIFEMOD model.  In  addition,  however,  there  are  technical
reasons  relating  to the  equivalence  of PAYG and  funded  pension  systems  in  this
modelling  exercise which  require  the  adoption  of a real rate of return  around  1.5
percentage points higher than  the rate of earnings  growth.  This issue is considered
more fully below in the discussion  of hybrid  pension systems.
The  contribution  conditions  presented  in  Table 7 relate  to  a hypothetical  average
LIFEMOD male, but we need to determine  how many people do better or worse than
this  average,  and  by how  much.  This  we  can  do  with  the  individual  life-cycle
earnings  profiles for the LIFEMOD population.  These individuals  do  not all have
a work history  of 52 weeks  of employment  in every year between  the first  year of
pension contribution  and  the age of retirement,  and  they have a wide dispersion  of
earnings  according to  their  past  employment  and  educational  history.  LIFEMOD
40allows us to examine the distributional  consequences of any particular  set of pension
system  rules and assumptions.
Funded  pensions in LIFEMOD
Table 8 presents  distributional  outcomes  for the LIFEMOD population  of males, on
the basis of a real rate of return  of 3% per  annum  and real earnings  growth  of 1.5%
per annum.  The first four columns  show,  for a range of retirement ages, the average
pension capital accumulated  over the life course for males according to their position
in  the lifetime earnings  distribution.  The amount  accumulated  with  four  different
rates  of contribution from 5% to 20% of earnings  are reported.  These capital  sums
are then  compared with  the  appropriate  annuity  costs in Table 6 to determine  the
percentage  of  average  male  LIFEMOD  earnings  that  would  be  replaced  by
contribution  rates of 5%, 10%, 15% and  20%; the figures  are presented  in  the final
four columns.
It  is  immediately  apparent  from  Table  8  that  lifetime  earnings  histories  have  a
significant impact on individual  ability to accumulate a fund sufficient to provide  an
adequate  pension annuity.  From Table 7c we can see that, for contribution beginning
at  age  21 with  retirement  at  age  65, and  with  real  interest  rates  at 3% and  real
earnings  growth  at 1.5% per  annum,  the  LIFEMOD average  fully-employed  male
needs  to contribute  12% of earnings  to  produce  a pension replacement  rate  of 50%
in  retirement.  From the third  panel  of Table 8, however,  we can see that even with
a  contribution  rate  of  15%,  only  the  top  four  deciles  of  the  lifetime  earnings
distribution  reach this 50% replacement  target, and the bottom two deciles fall below
the  33% replacement level.  If we look  at  the experience of women under  the same
contribution  and retirement conditions  (the third panel of Table 9), we can see a more
extreme picture.  Not only is the pension  replacement rate much lower, with  only the
top decile accumulating a fund sufficient  to purchase a pension annuity equal to 50%
of  average  male  LIFEMOD full-time  earnings,  but  the  distribution  is  also  more
skewed  that for men, with  the ratio  of highest  to lowest replacement rate  standing
at 7.57:1 for women compared  with  4.27:1 for men.
41Table 8
Proportion  of average male LIFEMOD  earnings replaced by pensions generated by
different contribution rates and retirement ages, ordered by decile of male lifetime
earnings
LIFEMOD men  l  l  l  l_I
dY = 1.5%, i = 3%, cOnt = 21
____________  Lifetime Pension Capitil  _  Pension replacement rate
Contrib.ratet  5%  10%  15%  1  20%  5%  J  10%  15% J  20%
ReHirenent  at 55
Bottom  7598  15196  22794  30392  3.7  7.5  11.2  15.0
2  10367  20734  31101  4'468  5.1  10.2  15.3  20.4
3  11933  23866  35794  47732  5.9  11.8  17.6  23.5
4  13542  1  27084  40626  54168  _  6.7  13.3  20.0  26.7
5  15005  30010  45015  60020  7.4  14.8  22.2  29.6
6  16662  33324  49986  66648  _  8.2  16.4  24.6  32.8
7  18479  36958  55437  73916  91  18.2  27.3  36.4
8  20776  41552  62328  83104  =  10.2  20.5  30.7  409
9  24591  49182  73773  98364  =  12.1  24.2  36.3  485
Top  33108  66216  99324  132432  16.3  32.6  48.9  65.2
Retiremnent  at 60f
Bottom  9230  18460  27690  36920  5.3  10.5  15.8  21.1
2  12631  25262  37843  50524  7.2  14.4  21.6  28.9
3  14321  28642  42963  57284  8.2  16.4  24.5  32.7
4  16216  32432  48648  64864  9.3  |  18.5  27.8  37.1
5  17988  35476  53964  71952  10.3  20.6  30.8  41.1
6  19954  39908  59862  79816  =  11.4  22.8  34.2  45.6
7  22151  44302  66453  88604  12.7  25.3  38.0  50.6
8  24910  49820  74730  99640  =  14.2  ,  28.5  42.7  56.9
9  29351  58702  88053  117404  16.8  33.5  50.3  67.1
Top  |  40033  1  80066  120099  160132  22.9  45.7  68.6  91.5
42Table  8 continued
|  Lifetime pension capital  Pension replacement rate
Contrib.rate  5  10%  15%  20% |j  5%  10%  15%  |  20%
Rctiremnent  at 65
Bottom  10661  21322  31483  42644  _  7.1  14.3  21 4  28.5
2  14747  29494  44241  58988  9_  9  19.7  29.6  39.5
3  16744  33488  50232  66976  11.2  22.4  33.6  44.8
4  18587  37174  55761  74348  1  2.4  24.9  37.3  49.7
5  20908  41816  62724  83632  14.0  28.0  42.0  55.9
6  23228  46456  69684  92912  15.5  31.1  46.6  62.2
7  25848  51696  77544  103392  17.3  34.6  51.9  69.2
8  29030  58060  87090  116120  19.4  38.8  58.3  77.7
9  34553  69106  103659  138212  _  23.1  46.2  69.3  92.5
Top  46899  93798  140697  187596  31.4  4  62.7  94.1  125.5
Retiremnent  at 70  __
Bottom  11951  23902  35853  47804  9.3  18.6  28.0  37.3
2  17061  34122  51183  68244  13.3  26.6  39.9  53.2
3  19010  38020  57030  76040  _  14.8  29.6  44.5  59.3
4  21326  42652  63978  85304  _  16.6  _3.3  49.9  66.5
5  24017  48034  72051  96068  _  18.7  37.4  56.2  74.q
6  26783  53566  80349  107132  1  20.9  41.8  62.6  83.5
7  29700  59400  89100  118800  _  23.2  46.3  69.5  92.6
8  33280  66560  99840  133120  25.9  51.9  77.8  1(03.8
9  39915  79830  119745  159660  31.1  62.2  93.4  124.5
Top  1  54404  108808  163212  217616__=  42.4  - 84.8  -127.2  169.7
43Table 9
Proportion of average female LIFEMOD earnings replaced by pensions generated
by different contribution rates and retirement ages, ordered by decile of  female
lifetime  earnings
LIFEMOD women  I  I
dY = 1.5%, i =3%  cont. age = 21  _
____________  Lifetime  pension  capital  Pension ieplacement rate
Contrib.rate  |  5%  10%  |15%  20%  o  5%  |  10%  15%  [  20/
Retirement  at 55  ___
Bottom  2729  5458  8187  10916  1.3  2.7  4.0  5.4
2  4388  8776  13164  17552  _  2.2  4.3  6.5  8.6
3  5377  10754  16131  21508  2.6  5.3  7.9  10.6
4  6308  12616  18924  25232  =  3.1  6.2  9.3  12.4
5  7405  14810  22215  29620  3.6  7.3  10.9  14.6
6  8349  16698  25047  33396  4.1  8.2  12.3  16.5
7  9811  19622  29433  39244  4.8  9.7  14.5  19.3
8  11484  22968  34452  45936  5.7  11.3  17.0  22.6
9  13764  27528  41292  55056  6.8  13.6  20.3  27.1
Top  20854  41708  62562  83416  10.3  20,5  30.8  41.1
Retirement  at  60
Bottom  3285  6570  9855  13140  1.9  3.8  5.6  7.5
2  5226  10452  15678  20904  _  3.0  6.0  9.0  11.9
3  6484  12968  19452  25936  3.7  7.4  11.1  14.8
4  7600  15200  22800  30400  4 3  8.7  13.0  17.4
5  8697  17394  26091  34788  5.0  9.9  14.9  19.9
6  10034  20068  30102  40136  _  5.7  1.5  172  22.9
7  11598  23196  34794  46392  6.6  13.3  19.9  26.5
8  13626  27252  40878  54504  _  7.8  15.6  23.4  31.1
9  16189  32378  48567  64756  9.2  18.5  27.7  37.0
Top  24632  49264  73896  98528  _  14.1  28.1  422  563
44Table 9 continued  l I  Lifetime Pension capital  Pension replacement rate
l________  5% 1  10%  15%  20%  5%  10%  15%  20%
Retirentent  at 65  _  l
Bottom  3820  7640  11460  15280  - 2.6  5.1  7.7  10.2
2  6137  12274  18411  24548  4.1  8.2  12.3  16.4
3  7662  15324  22986  30648  5.1  10.3  15.4  20.5
4  8844  17688  26532  35376  5_  .9  11.8  17.7  23.7
5  10308  20616  30924  41232  _  6.9  13.8  20.7  27.6
6  11796  23592  35388  47184  7.9  15.8  23.7  31.6
7  13682  27364  41046  54728  =  __  9.2  18.3  27.5  36.6
8  15948  31896  47844  63792  10.7  21.3  32.0  42.7
9  19160  38320  57480  76640  12.8  25.6  38.4  51.3
Top  29075  58150  87225  116300  19.4  38.9  58.3  77.8
Retirement  at 70  l
Bottom  4284  8568  12852  17136  3.3  6.7  10.0  13.4
2  7031  14062  21093  28124  _  55  11.0  16.4  219
3  8752  17504  26256  35008  _  6.8  13.6  205  273
4  10237  20474  30711  40948  8.0  16.0  23.9  31.9
5  11819  23638  35457  47276  9.2  18.4  27.6  36.9
6  13542  27084  40626  54168  10.6  21.1  31.7  42.2
7  15637  31274  46911  62548  12.2  24.4  36.6  48.8
8  18582  37164  55746  74328  14.5  29.0  43.5  58.0
9  22357  44714  67071  89428  =  17.4  34 9  523  697
TOD  =  32871  65742  98613  131484  _  25.6  51.3  76.9  102.5
45The pension replacement outcomes look very  different if, instead of relating pension
paid  to average male full-time earnings,  we consider  the pension paid in relation  to
the average last earnings for each gender  and  decile group.  Table 10 compares,  by
decile  of lifetime earnings, the  replacement  rates  of pensions  (generated  by  a 15%
contribution  rate on earnings, with retirement  at 65) relative to male average full-time
earnings  and  own gender  and  decile-specific  last  recorded  earnings.  The absolute
amount  of the pension is identical in both  cases, but  the replacement rates are very
different.  For  the bottom  decile  of  women,  a  15% contribution  rate  produces  a
pension  replacement rate of 21% of the last earnings  recieved by this decile group  of
female workers,  which appears  quite  respectable.  However,  since the last full-time
earnings  for  this  poorest  group  of  women  were  only  £3661 per  annum,  this
replacement  rate in fact produces  an annual  pension  of just over £800, or only 7.7%
of average male full-time earnings.  If poverty  prevention  is an important element of
any  pension  system, then  minimum  pensions  and  replacement  rates  need  to  be
calculated by reference to some socially-based  norm such as average earnings, rather
than by  reference to own earnings  history.
Table  10
Replacement  rates  produced  by  a  funded  pension  with  15% contribution  of
earnings,  calculated  relative  to  average  male  full-time  earnings  and  own  gender
and  decile-spedfic  last recorded  earnings.
Men  Women
Av. male Y  Last own Y  Av. male Y  Last own Y
1st  21.4  34.8  7.7  21.1
2nd  29.6  44.9  12.3  34.1
3rd  33.6  47.2  15.4  36.6
4th  37.3  48.9  17.7  39.2
5th  42.0  53.3  20.7  42.1
6th  46.6  52.6  23.7  42.8
7th  51.9  53.2  27.5  41.1
8th  58.3  53.6  32.0  43.2
9th  69.3  54.8  38.4  44.6
Top  94.1  54.7  58.3  47.5
46Figure 5
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The distributional outcomes of the LIFEMOD simulations reported in the tables above
depend  upon  the interaction of the socio-economic  characteristics of the LIFEMOD
population  with  the specific details  of pension  scheme  rules and  assumptions.  As
Table 7 shows,  the application  of different  retirement  ages, real rates of return  and
rates of real earnings  growth  have a major impact  on the contribution rate required
for any  given replacement  rate for an average individual;  they are, in  effect scaling
47factors.  However,  these  scaling  factors  have  a  differential  impact  on  individuals
according to their personal  employment  histories;  high real earnings growth  and low
rates  of return  make earnings  in  later  life relatively  more  significant  in  terms  of
capital  accumulation than  earnings  early  in life.  Figures 5 and 6 give an indication
of this effect for an individual  retiring  at  65, with  the average LIFEM_JD full-time
male  age-specific earnings,  but  with  15-year  earnings  gaps  early  (age 28-42) and
late(age 49-63)  in life. The figures present  the highest cost (real earnings growth  [dY]
2%, real rate of return  [i] 2%) and  lowest  cost (real earnings growth  0%, real rate of
return  4%) scenarios from Table 7.  Although  the absolute value of the  capital sum
accumulated  by  age  65  will  be  different  in  each  case, the  data  is  presented  in
proportional  terms for ready  comparison.  The figures show that, with  an earnings
gap at young ages, the capital  accumulation  profile is highei when i =  4% and  dY =
0%, than when both i and  dY = 2%.  However,  if the earnings gap appears  at older
ages,  the leverage  from past  earnings  growth  when  i and  dY =2% dominates  the
effect of past real interest rates at 4% in the absence of any real earnings  growth.  For
individuals  who  have  lifetime  earnings  profiles  that  diverge  from  the  average,
therefore, the actual rates of return  and real earnings growth that they experience will
affect their relative  as well as their  absolute  pension fund  accumulation  outcomes.
From  LIFEMOD we can  determine  how  many  people  have  their  relative pension
accumulation  altered  by  the  interaction  of different  rates of earnings  growth  and
investment  returns.  Table  11  shows  the  extent  to  which  there  is movement  by
indiv duals  between  deciles  of  the  pension  fund  distributions  based  on  actual
individual  earnings profiles and  the alternatives  of i = 2%, dY = 2%, and i = 4%, dY
=  0%.  First,  LIFEMOD individuals  who  survive  to  age  65  have  been  ranked
according to their decile position  in the  pension  fund  accumulation  distribution  on
the basis of i=2%, dY=2%, and  then  re-ranked  on  the basis of i=4%, dY=0%.  The
percentage  who  remain  in  or  move  between  deciles  in  these  two  distribution  is
reported  in the cells of table 11.
48Table 11
Cross-tabulation of decile rankings  of pension  capital accumulation according to
different assumptions about real rate of return and rate of earnings growth
i=2%, dY=2%
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  Rth  9th  Tcp
1st  82.1  16.6  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 0  0.0
2nd  17.2  61.9  19.4  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
3rd  0.6  19.7  53.6  24.4  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
4th  0.0  1.8  21.0  47.5  25.1  4.4  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0
i=4%  5th  0.0  0.0  4.4  20.6  46.4  24.4  4.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
dY=0%  6th  0.0  0.0  0.3  5.6  22.3  49.4  21.3  1.3  0.0  0.0
7th  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  4.1  19.1  56.9  18.9  0.9  0.0
8th  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  2.8  16.3  62.1  17.8  0.3
9th  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  17.9  70.9  10.0
Top  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  10.3  89.7
Clearly these earnings growth  rate and  interest rate assumptions  lead to non-trivial
differences  in  relative  pension  outcomes,  thou_gh the  majority  of  the  relative
movement  is across only one decile.  We can further examine the data to establish the
characteristics  of those who  move  between  deciles.  In Figures  5 and  6 above  we
suggested  that the key factor is the period  in  the life-course during  which  the bulk
of income is received.  In Table  12 we  examine  two cases - where  30% or more  of
lifetime  income is received  between  the  ages  of 20 and  29 ('young  earners'),  and
where 30% or more of lifetime income is received between the ages of 50 and 59 ('old
earners').  For the LIFEMOD population  of 3195 individuals  who live to at least age
65, 23.3% of lifetime  income  is received  between  ages  20  and  29, and  20.4% is
received  between ages 50 and  59.
49TABLE  12
Percentage of LIFEMOD  individuals who move between deciles of pension capital distribution according  to changes in real
rates of return and real eamings growth, by age distribution  of original Income.
Young  earners
ill  121  131
All  i2,dY2 = i4,dY0  i2,dY2 -+  i4,dYO  :4,dyO  e  i2,dY2
Less than 30% life-time  65.31  ;1.96  22.73
earnings ages 20-29  (n=2718)
More thar 30% life-time  43.40  56.60  0.0
earnings ages 20-29 (n-477)
Males  i2,dY2 = i4,dYO  i2,dY2 -+ i4,dYO  i4,dyO  -+ i2,dY2
Less than 30% life-time  66.87  11.95  21.17
earnings ages 20-29  (n=1464)
More than 30% life-time  20.45  79.55  0.0
earnings ages 20-29 (n=44)
..............................................  I..........................I.............
Females  i2,dY2 = i4,dYO  i2,dY2 -+  i4,dYO  i4,dyO  -+ i2,dY2
Less than 30% life-time  63.48  11.96  24.56
earnings  ages 20-29 (n=1254)
More than 30% life-time  45.73  54.27  0.0
earnings ages 20-29  (n=433)
Old earners
[1  1[2)  131
All  i2,dY2 - i4,dYO  i2,dY2 -*  i4,dYO  i4,dyO  -*  i2,dY2
Less  than  30% life-time  64.25  21.20  14.55
earnings ages 50-59 (n=2750)
More than 30% life-time  48.31  2.70  48.99
earnings ages 50-59  (n=445)
Males  i2,dY2  =  i4,dYO  i2,dY2  -*  i4,dYO  i4,dyO -+  i2,dY2
Less than 30% life-time  68.24  15.84  15.92
earnings ages 50-59 (n=1294)
More than 30% life-time  49.07  2.34  48.60
earnings ages 50-59 (n=214)
......................  I  ........  ........  ......  ....  ........  ......  ...  .........................
Females  i2,dY2  = i4,dYO  i2,dY2  -*  i4,dYO  i4,dyO -*  i2,dY2
Less than 30% life time  60.71  2;.96  13.32
eanings  ages 50-59 (n=1456)
More than 30% life-time  47.62  3.03  49.35
earnings ages 50-59 (n=231)
50Table 12 presents  cross-tabulations  of interdecile movement.  Column [1] shows the
percentage  of  each  row  that  remains  in  the  same  decile  of  the  pension  capital
accumulation  distribution  regardless  of whether  real interest is 2% and real earnings
growth 2% or real interest 4% and zero real earnings  growth.  Column [2] shows the
percentage  who  move  to a higher decile  when  changing  from  i = 2%, dY=  2°/, to i =
4%O  dY = 0%, and column [3] shows the percentage who move to a higher  decile when
changing  assumptions  from  i = 4%, dY  = 0% to i = 2%, dY = 2%.  As  expected  from
figures 6 and 7, 'young  earners'  show a very clear tendency  to move to higher deciles
under  the  assumptions  of column  [2], and  'old  earners'  show  a clear tendency  to
move to higher deciles under  the assumptions  of column [3]. Since over 90 per cent
of 'young earners' are womrn  (who accumulate of 30% of lifetime earnings before the
age of 30 because caring responsibilities  restrict  their  opportunities  for subsequent
full-time employment),  the  outcomes  of the different  earnings  growth  and  rate of
return  assumptions  have  obvious  gender  implications.  Because  of  the  high
probability  of  an  interrupted  employment  history  in  mid-life,  women  benefit
relatively  more than men from  a scenario  in which real earnings  growth  is low and
real rates of return  high.
However,  despite  these relative  effects, women  reach pension  age on  average with
a  pension  capital  fund  much  lower  in  absolute  terms  than  that  for men.  From
LIFEMOD we can exantine the co-determinants  of low pension capital accumulation.
The capital sum accumulated  by each of the 1508 men (ANUMEN) and 1687 women
(ANUWOMEN) who survive  in LIFEMOD to retire at 65 and  who have contributed
15% of annuial earnings  (with  i  = 3%, dY=1.5%) can be regressed  on a number  of
socio-economic characteristics.  In  equations  [1] and  [2] reported  in  Table  13 the
independent  variables used  are:
UNEMPTOT:  total period  spent  unemployed  up  to age 65 (in years)
YRSTERT:  years of tertiary  education
LASTEARN:  last full-time  earnings
YRSCHILD:  total number  of years with  dependent  child  under  16 in household
51Table 13
Regression estimates of co-determinants of pension  capital accumulation
EQUATION 1  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
****  **s*************.*********************.****  ******.*************.**  ****s***.***
Dependent variable in  ANUMEN
1508 observations used for estimation from  1 to 1508
Regressor  Coefficient  Standard Error  T-Ratio[Prob]
UNEMPTOT  -2671.0  96.3553  -27.7201X.000]
YRSTERT  1529.6  344.1266  4.4449X.0001
LASTEARN  4.9689  .10672  46.5608[.000]
CNT  35612.1  1150.5  30.9523C.o00]
R-Squared  .73490  F-statistic  PF 3,1504)  1389.8[.000]
R-Bar-Squared  .73437  S.E. of Regression  16219.8
Residual  Sum of Squares  3.96E+ll  Moan of Dependent Variable  72344.5
S.D. of Dependent Variable  31470.5  Maximum of Log-likelihood  -16756.3
DW-statistic  1.9243
EQUATION  2  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
*********************..***..***.**************.  ************************.***-***.*
Dependent variable is  ANUWOdEN
1687 observations used for estimation from  1 to 1687
Regressor  Coefficient  Standard Error  T-Ratio[Prob]
UNE1BMPTOT  -2414.0  195.4153  -12.3530(.000]
YRSTERT  1198.6  296.0607  4.0486[.000l
LASTEARN  3.3226  .093010  35.7226[.000]
YRSCHILD  -146.6611  39.1864  -3.7427(.000]
C'NT  23107.2  1138.5  20.29641.0001
***********-**************  *********R************  -*---********-******************.
R-Squared  .51585  F-statistic  P( 4,1682)  448.0376[.000]
R-Bar-Squared  .51470  S.E. of Regression  15884.7
Residual  Sum of  Squares  4.24E+ll  Mean ot Dependent Variable  37921.8
S.D. of Dependent Variable  22602.0  Maximum of Log-likelihood  -18709.8
DW-statistic  1.9703
These  equations  show,  not  surprisingly,  that  the  total  amount  of pension  capital
accumulated  is positively related  to last  full-time  earnings  and  to years of tertiary
education  for  both  men  and  women,  and  negatively  related  to  years  of
unemployment.  For women, pension capital is also negatively related to the number
of years  with  dependent  children  in  the  household.  Last full-time earnings  is the
dominant  variable  in both  equations,  with  an  elasticity  of .69 for men and  .57 for
women.  The elasticity on UNEMPTOT for women  is -.15, and on YRSCHILD  it is -
.10, so in terms of pension  capital accrual having  a child under  16 in the household
has almost as much impact on women as a year of unemployment.  The interruption
of employment  experienced  by  women  who  have  children  necessarily diminishes
their  chances of accumulating  reasonable  pension  entitlements  in a funded  pension
system.
52Joint contributions
This  long-term  effect of child-care  on  women's  pension  entitlements  in  a  funded
system  can be ameliorated  by some system  of contribution-sharing  within marriage.
To determine  the effectiveness of this, we have imposed  a contribution-sharing rule
on  LIFEMOD married  couples.  The  income  of  married  couples  is  pooled,  and
pension  contributions paid from this joint income are split equally and paid into the
individual  pension  funds of husband  and  wife during  each year of marriage.  If the
couple  divorce,  they  each  carry  their  individual  pension  fund  with  them,  and
continue  to make contributions  from their individual  earnings  while single.  If they
remarry,  contributions  from pooled current  income of the new couple are again split
equally,  but  the  pension  funds  of husband  and  wife  remain  separate.  This rule
means  that, for married  couples, individual  pension  contributions  are a function of
current  joint  income, but  individual  pension  funds  are  a  function  of  individual
contribution  histories.
Table 14 shows the overall effect of joint contributions  in a funded  scheme in which
all earners  make pension  contributions  of 15% per  annum,  with  i = 3% and  dY =
1.5%. The table reports  the percentage of the LIFEMOD population  surviving to age
65 who accumulate enough capital to purchase  an annuity  equal to either 50% or 33%
of  average  male  full-time  LIFEMOD  earnings.  On  the  basis  of  their  own
contributions,  over three-quarters  of men reach  the 33% replacement rate, and  ovcr
one-third  reach the 50% rate. For women, however,  fewer than one-quarter meet the
lower replacement  rate, and  a trivial 6% accumulate  enough capital to meet the 50%
replacement  target.  Moving from an own contribution  to a joint contribution basis
fundamentally  changes the outcomes.  The proportion  of the total population meeting
the lower 33% replacement target rises from 48% to 53%, but the proportion  meeting
the higher 50% targetfalls from 21% to 16%. This is because women's  earnings (and
therefore  contributions)  are  so much  lower  than  men's  that  the pooling  and  equal
division of contributions drags many men below the higher target which they reached
on  the  basis  of  their  own  contributions.  The joint  contribution  rule  significantly
benefits women, bringing  almost half of them  up to trie 33%°  replacement rate, but it
does so at a clear cost to their husbands.
53Table 14
Percentage of LIFEMOD  population retiring at 65 who have accumulated a pension
fund  sufficient  to provide a pension  equal  to 33% and 50% of average full-time
male LIFEMOD  earnings,  on the basis of own contributions and joint contributions
All  Men  Women
Own contrib.  48.23  76.3  23.2
33% replacement  _
Own  contrib.  21.3  38.1  6.3
50% replacement
Joint contrib.  53.2  59.0  48.0
33% replacement
Joint contrib.  16.6  20.0  13.5
50% replacement
We  can  examine  the effect of joint  contributions  more  closely by  looking  at  the
proportion  of people who move between  deciles in a ranking  of the distribution  of
accumulated  pension  capital as we move  from  an individual  contribution  basis  to
joint  contributions.  Table 15  presents  cross-tabulations  of the ranking according to
these  two sets of contribution rules.
54Table 15
Cross-tabulation of decile rankings of pension  capital accumulation according to different  assumptions about contribution rules
=I  _______  JOINT CONTRIBUTIONS
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  Top
w  lst  49.2  15.4  11.0  7.5  6.3  2.8  3.8  2.5  0.6  0.9 N  2nd  9.1  22.5  14.4  10.3  6.9  6.3  3.1  3.1  3.1  1.3
C  3rd  14.1  24.1  13.2  12.2  11.9  9.7  15.3  3.8  4.1  1.6 0 
- 11 N  4th  4.1  18.1  22.8  13.1  9.4  9.7  6.9  8.2  5.9  1.9 T  5th  2.5  11.6  13.8  23.8  16.0  14.1  7.2  6.6  3.5  0.9
I  6th  0.6  6.9  15.6  14.1  18.1  19.1  8.4  8.4  5.9  2.8
U  7th  0.3  1.3  7.5  12.2  13.4  16.3  21.9  12.2  9.1  5.9
T  8th  0.0  0.3  1.6  6.6  15.4  13.5  17.9  25.4  14.7  4.7 O  9th  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  2.5  8.8  22.8  20.0  30.3  15.3 N  --
S  Top  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8  9.7  22.8  64.6
Table  15  shows  that  there  is  considerable  movement  across  the  total  income
distribution  in the relative positions  of individuals  according to the rules of pension
fund  accumulation.  This is not surprising  given  the changes shown in Table 14 in
the proportions  of men and women  affected by the joint contribution rule.  Further
disaggregation  by gender is instructive.  When ranked  on individual  contributions,
very  few men find  themselves in the  lowest  quintile  of the distribution  (1.7%) and
only 21.8% are located in the bottom  half.  However,  if pension contributions during
marriage  are split evenly between  the couple regardless  of the source of the income,
men's  position  within the total distribution  changes markedly.  In this case 13.3% of
men  are dragged  into the bottom  quintile  and  44.3% into the bottom half.  If joint
contributions  acted  to  entirely  eliminate  gender  inequality  in  a  funded  pension
system, we would expect on average  10% of men and 10% of women in each decile
grouping.  In practice, as Table 16 shows, even after contribution sharing men are still
over-represented  in  the  upper  deciles,  though  much  less so  than on  the  basis  of
55individual  contributions.
Table  16
Proportion  of men and  women  in  each  decile  of distribution  on basis  of own and
of joint  contributions
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  Top
M  Own  0.9  0.8  3.8  5.4  10.9  12.6  13.3  16.1  17.8  18.4
Jnt  5.2  8.1  9.6  10.7  10.7  9.8  11.7  10.5  11.2  12.7
F  Own  18.1  18.3  15.5  14.2  9.1  7.7  7.1  4.5  3.1  2.4
Jnt  14.3  11.7  10.4  9.4  9.3  10.2  8.5  9.5  9.0  7.6
- ~-  .
Capital  top-ups
With joint contributions over one third  of men and more than half of women still fail
to accumulate a fund capable of purchasing  a pension annuity  at age 65 equal to 33%
of  average  full-time male  earnings.  If a  funded  pension  system  is to  satisfy  the
criterion  of poverty  prevention,  then  these  individuals  will need  a tax transfer  in
order to obtain a minimum  pension.  We have modelled the cost of providing  lump-
sum  capital top-ups  to people  who  reach  age 65 with  a pension  fund  less than  the
amount  required  for a 33% replacement  rate.
Table  17 shows  the  mean  amount  of  lump-sum  top-up  for  individual  and  joint
contributions,  for  the  entire  LIFEMOD  population,  and  for  men  and  women
separately.  Not  surprisingly,  given  what  has  already  been  said  about  women's
earnings,  it is women who receive  the majority  of the capital top-ups  - alrr cst 90%
on  the basis  of individual  contributions,  and  two-thirds  of top-ups  on  the  basis of
joint contributions.  As noted  above, the joint contribution rule reduces the proportion
of men  who reach  the 33% replacement  threshold,  and  so increases the proportion
receiving lump-sum  capital top-ups.
56Table 17
Mean amount of annual capital top-ups  received by LIFEMOD  population at age
65 with minimum pension replacement target of 33% of male full-time earnings
________________  __________________  Mean(£)
Own  9585.3





Joint  contributions  4110.0
Own  16085.1
WOMEN  contributions
Joint contributions  7216.0
The number  of people aged 65 in 1985 was about 561,000. This allows us to estimate
the cost of lump-sum  capital top-ups  for the UK population  reaching age 65 in 1985;
for a funded  pension system  based  on  individual  contributions  of 15% of earnings
and  a minimum  pension  target of 33% of average  male full-time earnings, the cost
is £5.4 billion, and for joint contributions  the cost is £3.2 billion.  This compares with
the actual cost of the public retirement  pension  in the UK in 1985 of £15.7 billion and
a gross national  product of £305 billion. These capital  top-ups would have required
an increase  in income tax of between  3 and  5 per cent.
iii) Hybrid pension  systems
In practice, hybrid pension systems are likely to be rather more complex than simply
a lump-sum  addition at retirement  to personal  funded  pensions.  Below we present
the results of a series of simulations  which  investigate  the effect of combining public
pay-as-you-go  and  private  defined  contribution  pension  systems in  a  number  of
different  ways. For the central analyses  of this paper  we have adopted i=3%, dY=1.5%
as the  most plausible assumptions,  and  when  these rates are applied to the income
streams  of the LIFEMOD population,  they produce  the replacement rates shown  in
57tables 8 and  9. Different rates  of earnings  growth  and real interest would  however
produce  different  replacement  rates  and  could  make  the  overall  performance  of
funded  pensions  either considerably  better  or worse  than  PAYG. The well  known
'Aaron condition' states  that  if  the sum  of the growth  rates  of population  and  real
earnings  exceed the market  rate of interest,  PAYG pension  schemes can provide  all
cohorts  with  higher  returns  than  funded  pensions  (Aaron,  1966). LIFEMOD is  a
single-cohort  microsimulation  model,  but  when used  in the cross-section implicitly
assumes  that  the  population  growth  rate  is zero.  The Aaron  condition  suggests,
therefore, that when i=dY in LIFEMOD, PAYG and funded  pension schemes should
support  identical  replacement  rates  for  any  given  contribution  rate,  that  if i>dY
funded  schemes will be preferable  and  if i<dY PAYG will be preferable.
Table 18 shows the annual pension  income generated in LIFEMOD by four different
contribution rates, based either on own  or joint incomes, for a PAYG system and for
four funded  systems with  different  combinations  of i and  dY. If i exceeds  dY by 2
percentage points or more, then funded  pensions dominate PAYG  but if i exceeds dY
by 1 percentage point or less the PAYG dominates funding. Note that the exact Aaron
principle does not hold in these simulations. This is due to the fact that the working-
age population  in LIFEMOD is larger than the pensioner population  because of adult
mortality  between  the  ages  of 21 and  65.  Aaron's  formulation  of the equivalence
conditions for PAYG and  funded  pension  systems is developed  using a two-period
model in which the population  is the same size in both periods.  In LIFEMOD, as in
any  real-world  population,  adult  mortality  will always  ensure  that the  contributor
population  in a PAYG  system  is larger  than the pensioner  population  even when the
population  growth rate is zero; in consequence,  the exact Aaron condition will never
apply.
58Table 18 Pension income generated by defined  contribution scheme versuses flat
rate PAYG under varying  assumption  concerning  real income  growth and real
interest rates
Contribution  PAYG  Funded  Funded  Funded  Funded
rate  1%i 2%dY  2%i 2%dY  3%i 2%dY  4%i 2%dY
5% own  1168  617  821  1101  1489
5% joint  619  826  1111  1508
10% own  2336  1235  1642  2202  2978
10% joint  1238  1652  2223  3016
15% own  3504  1852  2462  3303  4467
15% joint  1857  2478  3334  4523
20% own  4672  2469  3283  4403  5957
20%  joint  1  2476  3303  4446  6031
The importance  of adopting  an operational  equivalence  between PAYG and funded
systems  in  the  evaluation  of any  pension  mix must  be  underlined.  Changing  the
assumptions  about  population  and  earnings  growth  and  real  rates of return  will
easily  allow funded  pension  systems  to  outperform  PAYG or vice versa. We have
deliberately chosen i=3%, dY=1.5%  in order to prevent  any overall system dominance
and  to permit  a clear discussion  of distributional  outcomes.  In practice, of course,
expected  economic  and  demographic  conditions  in  any  country  may well tend  to
favour  PAYG or funded  pension  systems.
Tables  19-22 report  the  distributional  outcomes  by  decile  of  discounted  lifetime
earnings  for people  who survive  to age 65 of five hybrid  pension schemes in which
all workers contribute 20% of annual earnings, in the following combinations: 0% flat-
rate PAYG and  20% defined-contribution;  5% PAYG and  15% defined-contribution;
10% PAYG and  10% defined-contribution;  15% PAYG and  5% defiined-contribution,
and 20% PAYG and 0% defined-contribution.  The three panels of table 19 report the
results  in  terms  of the  proportion  of average  male full-time  annual  earnings  that
would  be  replaced  by  pensions  based  on  own-income  contributions,  for  all
individuals,  and  for men and  women  separately.
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Proportion of average male annual wages  replaced by different hybrid pension
systems, when contributions are based  on own  income.
(19a) All  individuals
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
____  -___  DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  319  .12  .20  .28  .36  .44
D2  320  .20  .26  .32  .38  .44
D3  319  .26  .31  .35  .40  .44
D4  320  .32  .35  .38  .41  .44
D5  319  .38  .40  .41  .43  .44
D6  320  .44  .44  .44  .44  .44
D7  320  .51  .49  .48  .46  .44
D8  319  .60  .56  .52  .48  .44
D9  320  .73  .66  .58  .51  .44
D10  319  1.06  .91  .75  .60  .44
ALL  3195  .46  .46  .45  .45  .44
(19b)  MIen
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  13  .08  .17  .26  .35  .44
D2  15  .22  .27  .33  .39  .44
D3  52  .27  .31  .36  .40  .44
D4  76  .32  .35  .38  .41  .44
D5  164  .38  .40  .41  .43  .44
D6  189  .44  .44  .44  .44  .44
D7  209  .51  .49  .48  .46  .44
D8  243  .60  .56  .52  .48  .44
D9  263  .73  .65  .58  .51  .44
D1  284  1.06  .90  .75  .60  .44
ALL  1508  .62  .58  .53  .49  .44
60(19c) Women
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  306  .12  .20  .28  .36  .44
D2  305  .20  .26  .32  .38  .44
D3  267  .26  .31  .35  .40  .44
D4  244  .32  .35  .38  .41  .44
D5  155  .39  .40  .41  .43  .44
D6  131  .44  .44  .44  .44  .44
D7  111  .51  .49  .47  .46  .44
D8  76  .61  .57  .53  .48  .44
D9  57  .73  .66  .59  .51  .44
D1O  35  1.07  .92  .76  .60  .44
ALL  1687  .33  .35  .38  .41  .44
The final row  of Table 19a shows  that  the  assumptions  of i  =  3% and  dY = 1.5%
create  an  approximate  equivalence  between  PAYG and  funded  pension  systems
within the demographic parameters  of the LIFEMOD model (as can be seen, there is
a  very  slight  in-built advantage  for  funded  pensions  in  this  and  the  subsequent
tables).  The  approximate  equivalence  condition  enables  us  to  make  direct
comparisons  of the distributional  outcomes  of different  combinations of PAYG and
funded  pension systems in Tables 19-22. Table 19a shows that all individuals  in the
bottom five deciles of the lifetime earnings  distribution  would fare better from a pure
flat-rate pay-as-you-go pension  than  from any hybrid  system and,  not surprisingly,
the  more  the  final  pension  depends  on  own  earnings  history,  the  lower  is  the
achieved replacement rate for these bottom  five deciles. In general, however,  pension
outcomes  for individuals  in  the sixth  decile of the lifetime income distribution  are
insensitive  to the mix of PAYG and  defined  contribution  pension elements.
The decile rankings in Tables 19-22 are by discounted  lifetime earnings.  In Table 19
the replacement rates for men (19b) and women (19c)  are almost identical within each
decile for each of the five types  of pension  system.  This is not surprising;  men and
61women  who  find  themselves  in  the  same  decile  of  the  distribution  of  lifetime
earnings  should  accumulate  similar  pension  entitlements  regardless  of the pension
system.  However,  as the first column in Tables 19b and 19c shows, women are very
heavily  over-represented  in  the  bottom  half  of  this  income  distribution.  In
consequences,  as the bottom  line of the  three  panels  of Table 19 shows,  while  the
different pension systems are (by design) more-or-less neutral  across the population
as  a  whole  in  terms  of the  average  replacement  rate  they  generate,  they  are  not
neuitral between men and women.  The higher lifetime earnings of men mean that on
average  they get almost  double  the  replacement  rate of women  in  a pure  funded
pension  system.  By definition  a  pure  flat-rate  PAYG system  provides  the  same
pension (and the same replacement  rate as a proportion  of average male earnings) to
all people regardless  of gender  or lifetime earnings.
Table 20 presents  the  same  data,  t ut this  time with  the  pension  replacement  rate
defined in relation to own individual  discounted  annualized  lifetime earnings (where
the  annualization  is based  upon  number  of years  of labour  force participation  for
each individual).  Although  the level of pension  received  by individuals  in similar
cells of Tables 19 and 20 is identical, the recorded replacement rates are very different
because  of  the  different  denominators  used.  In  relation  to  own  discounted
annualized  lifetime  earnings,  a  pure  PAYG pension  produces  the  most  widely
varying  replacement  rates,  while  pure  funding  produces  the  least  variance  of
outcomes.  Tables 19 and 20 demonstrate  very clearly the relative merits of flat-rate
PAYG pensions  in  achieving  minimum  income  goals  and  of funded  pensions  in
achieving  income replacement  goals.
62Table 20
Proportion of own annualized lifetime  earnings replaced by different hybrid
pension  systems,  when contributions are based on own income.
(20a)  All  individuals
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
DI  319  .39  .65  .90  1.15  1.40
D2  320  .52  .68  .83  .99  1.14
D3  319  .56  .65  .74  .84  .94
D4  320  .57  .63  .68  .73  .78
D5  319  .59  .61  .63  .66  .68
D6  320  .61  .61  .61  .61  .61
D7  320  .65  .62  .60  .58  .56
D8  319  .66  .62  .57  .53  .48
D9  320  .66  .60  .53  .47  .40
D10  319  .68  .58  .48  .38  .29
ALL  3195  .59  .62  .66  .69  .72
(20b) Men
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  13  .28  .45  .62  .79  .96
D2  15  .39  .50  .60  .70  .80
D3  52  .48  .56  .64  .71  .79
D4  76  .53  .57  .62  .67  .72
D5  164  .59  .61  .64  .66  .68
D6  189  .61  .61  .61  .61  .61
D7  209  .65  .62  .60  .58  .56
D8  243  .66  .62  .58  .53  .49
D9  263  .67  .60  .54  .47  .40
DIO  284  .67  .58  .48  .39  .29
ALL  1508  .63  .60  .57  .54  .51
63(20c) Women
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
DI  306  .39  .65  .91  1.16  1.42
D2  305  .53  .69  .84  1.00  1.16
D3  267  .57  .67  .77  .87  .97
D4  244  .59  .64  .70  .75  .80
D5  155  .60  .62  .64  .66  .69
D6  131  .61  .61  .61  .60  .60
D7  111  .64  .62  .60  .58  .56
D8  76  .64  .60  .56  .51  .47
D9  57  .65  .59  .52  .46  .40
D10  35  .67  .58  .48  .38  .29
ALL  1687  .55  .64  .74  .83  .92
Tables  21 and  22 repeat  the  analysis  of  tables  19 and  20. People  remain  ranked
according to their place in the 1 fetime income distribution, but the replacement  rates
assume that the pension systems operate  under the joint contribution rule. Comparing
tables 19 and 20 with tables 20 and  21, it is clear that joint contributions significantly
improve  pension  outcomes  for  almost  all  women,  both  relative  to  average  male
earnings  and  to own annualized  lifetime  earnings.  This  improvement  for women
comes  at  the expense of men;  the  final  row  of  tables  19a and  21a show  that  the
overall  replacement  rates  under  the  two  different  contribution  rules  are  virtually
identical  for the population  as  a whole.  Joint contributions  do  almost  nothing  to
improve  the replacement rates for the bottom  three deciles of males generated  by the
pure  defined  contribution system  (19b and  21b) whereas  they significantly  improve
pension outcomes for the bottom 7 deciles of women (19c and 21c). This may be due
in part to interdependence between  the employrnent  status of spouses, with the wives
of unemployed  men having low participation  rates.  It is also a function of the way
in which LIFEMOD  mirrors the marriage  market, with better educated people having
a high  probability  of marrying  each  other,  and  vice versa.
64Table 21
Proportion of average male annual wages replaced by different hybrid pension
systems, when contributions are based on joint income in marriage.
(21a) All individuals
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  319  .27  .31  .36  .40  .44
D2  320  .34  .37  .39  .42  .44
D3  319  .37  .39  .41  .42  .44
D4  320  .41  .42  .43  .43  .44
D)  319  .41  .42  .43  .43  .44
D6  320  .44  .44  .44  .44  .44
D7  320  .49  .48  .47  .45  .44
D8  319  .53  .50  .49  .46  .44
D9  320  .60  .56  .52  .48  .44
D1I  319  .80  .71  .62  .53  .44
ALL  3195  .47  .46  .45  .45  .44
(21b)  Men
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
DI  13  .10  .19  .27  .36  .44
D2  15  .22  .28  .33  .39  .44
D3  52  .27  .31  .36  .40  .44
D4  76  .30  .33  .37  .40  .44
D5  164  .35  .38  .40  .43  .44
D6  189  .38  .40  .41  .43  .44
D7  209  .43  .43  .44  .44  .44
D8  243  .49  .48  .47  .45  .44
D9  263  .57  .54  .51  .47  .44
D1O  284  .78  .70  .61  .53  .44
ALL  1508  Q  .49  .47  .46  .44
65(21c) Women
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  306  .28  .32  .36  .40  .44
D2  305  .35  .38  .40  .42  .44
D3  267  .39  .41  .42  .43  .44
D4  244  .44  .44  .44  .44  .44
D5  155  .47  .46  .46  .45  .44
D6  131  .54  .51  .49  .4f  .44
D7  111  .60  .56  .52  .48  .44
D8  76  .65  .60  .54  .49  .44
D9  57  .73  .66  .59  .51  .44
D1O  35  .99  .86  .72  .58  .44
ALL  1687  .44  .44  .44  .44  .44
Table 22
Proportion of own  annualized lifetime  earnings replaced by different hybrid
pension  systems, when contributions are based joint income in marriage.
(22a)  All  individuals
N  PAYG=0  rPAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
DI  319  .91  1.03  1.15  1.28  1.41
D2  320  .92  .97  1.03  1.08  1.14
D3  319  .81  .84  .87  .91  .94
D4  320  .74  .75  .76  .77  .78
D5  319  .64  .65  .66  .67  .68
D6  320  .62  .62  .61  .61  .61
D7  320  .62  .60  .59  .57  .56
D8  319  .58  .55  .53  .51  .48
D9  320  .54  .51  .48  .44  .40
D10  319  .52  .46  .40  .35  .29
ALL  3195  .69  .70  .71  .72  .73
66(22b) Men
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
l___  DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  13  .32  .48  .64  .80  .96
D2  15  .40  .50  .60  .70  .80
D3  52  .48  .56  .64  .71  .79
D4  76  .48  .54  .60  .66  .72
DS  164  .55  .58  .61  .65  .68
D6  189  .53  .55  .57  .60  .62
D7  209  .54  .55  .55  .55  .56
D8  243  .54  .53  .51  .50  .49
D9  263  .52  .50  .47  .44  .41
D10  284  .51  .45  .40  .34  .29
ALL  1508  .53  .52  .52  .51  .51
(22c) Women
N  PAYG=0  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=20  DC=5  DC=0
Dl  306  .9,  1.05  1.17  1.30  1.42
D2  305  .94  1.00  1.05  1.10  1.16
D3  267  .87  .90  .92  .94  .96
D4  244  .82  .82  .81  .81  .81
D5  155  .73  .72  .70  .70  .69
D6  131  .73  .70  .67  .64  .60
D7  111  .77  .72  .66  .61  .56
D8  76  .68  .63  .58  .52  .47
D9  57  .65  .59  .52  .46  .40
Zl0  35  .63  .54  .46  .38  .29
ALL  1687  .84  .86  .88  .90  .92
67As  a  supplement  to  this  analysis  by  income  deciles,  Tables  23 and  24 present  the
outcome  of the different  pension  mixes  with  people  grouped  according  to their  level
of  educational  achievement.  EDUl  is  those  individuals  who  left  school  at  the
minimum  leaving  age  of  16, EDU2  is  those  who  continued  beyond  16 but  did  not
attend  university,  and  EDU  3 is those  with  uriiversity-level  education.
Table  23
Proportion  of average  male  annual  wages  replaced  by different  hybrid  pension
systems,  when  contributions  are based  on own  income  and  joint  income  in
marriage,  ranked  by educational  experience
EDU  |  POP  PAYG=0  PAYG=5 I PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=10  DC=5  DC=0
Own Contributions
EDUl  ALL  .37  .39  .41  .42  .44
EDU2  ALL  .46  .46  .45  .45  .44
EDU3  ALL  .65  .60  .54  .50  .44
Joint  Contributions
EDUl  ALL  .40  |.41  .42  .43  .44
EDU2  ALL  .48  .47  .46  .45  .44
EDU3  ALL  .59  |.55  .52  .48  .44
68Table 24
Proportion  of  own  anualized  lifetime  earnings  replaced  by  different  hybrid
pension systems,  when contributions are based  on own income and joint income
in  marriage, ranked by educational experience
EDU  POP  PAYG=O  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
DC=20  DC=15  DC=10  DC=5  DC=0
Own Contributions
EDUl  ALL  .60  .67  .74  .81  .88
EDU2  ALL  .58  .61  .64  .67  .69
EDU3  ALL  .57  .55  .53  .51  .49
Joint Contributions
EDU1  ALL  .75  .72  .82  .85  .88
EDU2  ALL  .68  .68  .69  .69  .69
EDU3  ALL  .58  - .56  .53  .51  .49
Given  that we would  expect earnings  to be related  .o educational  acheivement  the
results  are  not  suprising,  mirroring  the  trends  described  above. The  greater  the
dependency  on  past  earnings  the  lower  the  replacement  rate  for  the  less  well
educated.  The most striking feature of the tables is the split between individuals  with
a  university  level  education  and  all  others.  Those  who  have  experienced  higher
education  have  much  higher  average  lifetime  earnings  and  so  they face  a lower
replacement  rate relative to own  earnings  but a much  higher rate relative to average
male earnings.
The effect of joint contributions  has limited  impact  on replacement  rates relative  to
average wage. Its effect is more marked  with regard  to own lifetime wage. Since the
proportionate  change in pension income is much  greater for those with low lifetime
average  earnings  (i.e.  wives)  than  high  (i.e.  husbands)  the  net  effect  of  joint
contributions  is to raise the average replacement  rate of each educational  group. The
replacement  rate  of persons  with  higher  education  is least sensitive to  the sharing
assumotion  in  part  because  that  group  contains  fewe  women  than  the  other
categories.
69A further  point  to note is that  in  tables  18-24 we have  assumed  that there  is full
compliance  with  PAYG contributions.  Any  degree  of  PAYG  avoidance  would
necessarily reduce the level of pensions  that could be paid to everyone, whereas  non-
payment  into an (indivualized)  funded  system  only affects the epnsion outcome  of
the non-payer.  Since the cost to individuals  of avoiding  PAYG contributions is much
less  than  that  involved  with  indivual  pension  funds  (a  standard  moral  hazard
problem),  it might be expected that  the actual  replacement  rate secured by a given
PAYG  contribution  rate  would  be  lower  than  we  have  assumed  especially  if
contribution/tax  collection systems  are  relatively  unsophisticated.
Table 25
Gini coefficients  of distribution of pension  income produced by different hybrid
pension  systems
Contribution  PAYG=O  PAYG=5  PAYG=10  PAYG=15  PAYG=20
basis  DC=20  DC=15  DC=1C  DC=5  DC=0
Own  .317  .214  .163  .083  0
Joint  .222  .169  .114  .058  0
Gini coefficient on lifetime earnings:  .310
Gini  coefficient on annualized  lifetime  earnings:  .274
As  we have  seen, although  the  pension  outcomes  for the  population  as  a  whole
appear  to  be system-neutral,  the  different  proportional  mix of funded  and  PAYG
elements  produce  very  different  distributional outcomes.  Table 25 summarizes  the
distributional  outcomes of the five different  pension  systems reported in tables 19-22.
The gini coefficient for pension  outcomes  produced  by  own contributions  into the
pure  defined  contribution  system  is obviously  almost  identical  to that  on lifetime
earnings.  Joint contributions consistently  reduce  inequality  in pension outcomes,  as
does a larger flat-rate PAYG element.  Both act to redistribute  pension resources from
rich (men)  to poor  (women). Thus  for any  government  concerned with  equity  and
pension  outcomes  it is  possible,  therefore,  to  think  of  a  trade-off between  joint
contribution  rules in defined  contribution  pensions  and  PAYG systems.
705. Summary and conclusions
In the last decade public pension  system  reform has appeared  on the political agenda
of  almost  all  the  newly  industrializing  and  older  industrial  countries.  The main
impetus behind the debate has been the macro economic cost of existing pay-as-you-
go public pension systems. Such costs have been escalating rapidly due to population
ageing  combined  with  a  slow  down  in  economic  growth  and  pension  system
maturity.  In  order  to  ameliorate  the  fiscal  burden  many  countries  are  now
contemplating  a  transition  from  public  PAYG to  fully  funded  pension  schemes.
However,  as  section  2  of  the  paper  makes  clear  at  the  individual  level  pension
systems  are  designed  to acheive  an  intertemporal  transfer  of income sufficient  to
prevent  abject poverty  in retirement  and  ideally  to acheive income replacement.
This paper examines the distributional  outcomes  of a wide variety of possible PAYG
and funded  pension systems, highlighting  the relative merits of each in achieving the
goals of mninimum  income and  income  replacement.
This  paper  has  used  a  dynamic  cohort  microsimulation  model  (LIFEMOD).
Microsirnulation modelling  is the  only way  to investigate the relative distributional
effects of different  pension systems  in  any  given  demographic  and  socio-economic
environment,  and  this paper  is a pioneering  attempt  to analyse pension  outcomes
using  a  dynamic  cohort  mnicrosimulation  model.  The  technique  allows  us  to
investigate  both  the  number  of  people  affected  by  a  change  in  contribution  or
eligibility  rules  in  any  pension  system,  and  to  examine  their  socio-economic
characteristics.  LIFEMOD is  parameterized  with  reference  to the  UK in  1985, so
specific results  cannot  be  considered  valid  for other  countries.  Nevertheless,  the
general  characteristics of winners  and  losers  in  any particular  pension  system  are
likely to be simnilar  across countries.
In summary,  the paper  has found  the following:
Pay-as-you-go pension  systems
In any flat-rate PAYG system  the proportion  of net beneficiaries will exceed
that of net  L.xpayers at retirement,  because  of the premature  death  of some
former tax-payers.
71Women benefit much more than men in such a system; in our simnulations  84%
of surviving  women  but  only 33% of surviving  men are net beneficiaries.
The gains  of women  are  due  to  their  higher  life expectancy  than  men and
lower lifetime earnings.
High  unemployment,  low educational  attainment  and  lone parenthood  all
increase the chance of being  a net beneficiary  (Table 1).
The imposition  of contribution  conditions  significantly  affects who gains and
who loses.
Almost  all  women  fulfil  the  condition  of  at  least  20  years  worth  of
contribution,  but  a  third  of women  fail to  meet  a condition  of 20 years  of
contribution  of at least  33% of average  full-time male contributions  (Table 3)
Never-married  women  fare better  than married  women  under  a contribution
condition with minimum  levels because  they are more likely to be in full-time
employment  and  so earning  higher  wages than  are married  women.
Imposing  a  joint  contributions  rule  significantly  increases  the  number  of
women  qualifying  under  the  duration  and  level  contribution  condition,
without  any significant  reduction  in the proportion  of men qualifying
As contribution  conditions  are  made  more  severe,  a joint  contribution  rule
becomes less beneficial for women  and  more  costly for men.
Funded pension  systems
The capital sums required  to produce  any particular  level of pension, and the
contribution rates required  to accumulate  these capital sums, depend  crucially
on the ages at which contributions  begin, and retirement  and death occur, and
on rates  of real earnings  growth  and  real rates  of return  (Tables 6 and 7).
Men accumulate  on  average  a mLuch  higher  level of pension  capital than do
women,  because  of their  higher  earnings  and  more  continuous  labour force
participation.
Years  of  tertiary  education  have  a  positive  impact  on  pension  fund
accumulation;  years  of  unemployment  and,  for  women,  years  with  a
dependent  child in  the household  have a negative  effect (Table 13).
The variance  of pension  capital accumulation  is much  greater for women than
for men (Tables 8 and  9).
If pension  replacement  rates are  calculated  by reference to own last full-time
earnings  rather  than  average  male  full  tirr  eamings,  women  achieve
72replacement  rates  close to those  of men,  though  the absolute value  of their
pension  is much lower  (Table 10).
Different  rates of real interest  and  earnings  growth  differentially  affect the
pension  fund  accumulation  individuals  (Table 11).
Women  benefit  more  from  high  rates  of return  and  low earnings  growth,
because  they  tend to  receive  a  higher  proportion  of their lifetime earnings
when  young (Table 12).
The  imposition  of  a  joint  contribution  rule  significantly  increases  the
proportion  of  women  who  meet  any  mniimum  pension  threshold,  but
decreases  the proportion  of men  who reach  this level (Table 14).
Despite the large distributional  effect of imposing joint contributions, men still
fare better in a funded  pension system  with joint contributions than do women
(Table 16).
Even with  joint  contributions,  some  men  and  many  women  fail to  achieve
minimum  pension levels.
If  the  pension  shortfall  is  compensated  for  by  lump-sum  capital  top-ups,
women receive 88% of top-ups  on the basis of own contributions and 66% on
the basis  of joint contributions.
Hybrid  pension  systems
In  mixed  PAYG and  funded  systems,  the  higher  the  proportion  of PAYG
contributions,  the greater  is the  replacement  rate for people in the bottom  40
percent of the lifetime earnings  distribution  (the majority of whom are women)
(Table 19).
Joint contributions  reduce  but  do  not  eliminate  the gains of women  from a
shift from funded  to PAYG systems  (Table 21).
Replacement  rates for the people  in  the middle  of the income distribution  are
insensitive  to any variant  of the PAYG/funded  combination.
Distributional comparisons between  PAYG and funded systems must be based
on parameters  which  allow  the  different  systems  to provide  similar  overall
pension repiacement  rates if using  similar  comtribution  rates.
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